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THE RIGHT TO INCLUDE
Daniel B. Kelly*
ABSTRACT
Recent scholarship has created renewed interest in the “right to exclude.”
Many contend that, because owners have a right to exclude, private property
has a tendency to promote individualism and exclusion. But, as I will argue,
property can promote sociability and inclusion by providing owners with
various ways of including others. Owners can assert their “right to include”
by waiving exclusion rights, dividing existing rights by contracts or property
forms, and creating new co-ownership arrangements. Inclusion is socially
beneficial insofar as it enables sharing and exchange, facilitates financing and
risk-spreading, and promotes specialization. Yet inclusion may entail costs,
including coordination difficulties, strategic behavior, and conflicts over use.
To mitigate such costs, the law authorizes not only informal and contractual
inclusion but also inclusion through various forms of property like easements,
leases, and trusts. By providing owners with a range of options by which to
include others, these forms help to ensure that an owner’s private incentive to
include converges with the socially optimal level of inclusion. Each form not
only binds third parties but also provides owners and those they may include
with a unique mixture of anti-opportunism devices, such as mandatory rules,
fiduciary duties, and supracompensatory remedies. Understanding how the
law promotes the social use of property provides insights into debates over the
property/contract interface, numerus clausus, and the right to exclude itself.
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INTRODUCTION
This Article contends that the ability of owners to “include” others in their
property is a central attribute of ownership and fundamental to any system of
private property. Too easily overlooked in debates about the right to exclude,
or the rights of others to be included, is that owners frequently include others
in the use, possession, and enjoyment of their property. The ability to include
others—by waiving the right to exclude, dividing existing rights by contract or
recognized forms of property, or creating new rights and forms—is critical for
coordinating economic activities and organizing social relationships.
Owners include others in different ways, with different legal implications.
Much inclusion is informal, e.g., a dinner invitation or a gratuitous license, in
which an owner decides not to enforce or to waive the right to exclude. With
informal inclusion, social norms, rather than law, usually govern the parties’
interactions. Inclusion also may be contractual, e.g., an agreement not to
withdraw a waiver or license. With contractual inclusion, the parties have legal
remedies, typically damages, if the owner breaches by revoking a waiver or if
the nonowner breaches by exceeding the scope of a license. In addition to
waiving exclusion informally or contractually, owners may rely on property
forms that facilitate inclusion. With proprietary inclusion, each form not only
binds third parties to a particular division of property but also provides the
original parties with a unique mixture of anti-opportunism devices, such as
mandatory rules, fiduciary duties, and supracompensatory remedies.
In the absence of contracts or property forms, an owner’s private incentive
to include others might be socially suboptimal. Although some types of
inclusion might still occur, parties would include others too little, fearful of
opportunism and conflicts over use. To combat such fears and increase
cooperation, the law authorizes formal devices like contracts and recognized
forms of property by which owners may include others. As a result, both
contracts and property forms can function as assurance mechanisms,
minimizing the risk of strategic behavior and conflicts over use.
This Article contends that, due to the risk of opportunistic behavior, a
proliferation of forms helps to ensure that the private incentive to include
others converges with the socially optimal level of inclusion. The law
facilitates cooperation because each form of inclusion entails different costs
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and benefits, and owners may choose among these various forms in deciding
whether, and under what circumstances, to include others in their property.
Generally, informal inclusion (e.g., gratuitous licenses or nonenforcement)
is less costly than formal inclusion because it relies on social norms rather than
law. However, if there is a danger of “high-value opportunism,”1 informal
inclusion may provide parties with too little certainty. If an owner decides to
withdraw a license or to enforce her rights, the nonowner may have no legal
remedy. Therefore, while including others via waiver or nonenforcement is, as
Robert Merges contends, an important “flip side” of exclusion,2 informal
inclusion, by itself, is inadequate to maximize the social use of property.
Contractual inclusion (e.g., formal waivers of exclusion or intellectual
property licenses) can be more costly than informal inclusion, but contracts
provide more certainty and deter many kinds of opportunism.3 If an owner
withdraws a contractual waiver or terminates a license, the licensee may sue
for breach. Conversely, if a licensee exceeds the scope of an inclusion, the
owner may sue the licensee to vindicate the owner’s rights. Knowing that legal
remedies are available, both parties may be less inclined to act strategically,
both at the outset and during performance of the contract.
Owners also may include others using various property forms, what this
Article calls “proprietary inclusion.” These property forms, from easements
and leases to trusts and corporations, are often similar to contracts in many
ways. But the forms may provide even more certainty and protection against
opportunism. Specifically, because property rights are in rem and “run with the
land,” property forms can provide greater certainty than informal or contractual
inclusion for successive owners and users. Moreover, while contracts deter
certain types of opportunism, property forms can provide additional protection
through a greater reliance on mandatory rules and fiduciary duties. Finally,
unlike contracts, which rely primarily on compensatory damages, property
forms often entail supracompensatory remedies like specific performance and
injunctions, punitive damages, and restitution, which may help to deter
strategic behavior.

1 See Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Contract Law Under Conditions of Radical Judicial Error, 94 NW. U.
L. REV. 749, 761 (2000) (defining high-value opportunism as “opportunism that cannot be deterred by the
threat of (nonlegal) retaliation”).
2 ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 296 (2011).
3 See Posner, supra note 1, at 762; see also infra Part III.B.
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A handful of legal scholars have mentioned inclusion and hinted at its
importance.4 But they have not yet developed a theory to justify an owner’s
right to include,5 or compared various forms of inclusion, including contractual
and proprietary inclusion, in detail.6 To fill this gap, this Article systematically
analyzes the right to include by assessing the benefits and costs of inclusion. It
then compares a number of institutional arrangements by which owners may
include others: from nonenforcement and waiver of the right to exclude, to
contracts and various forms of property.
The prior literature does emphasize two social dimensions of property: how
using property may generate social costs,7 and how owning property may
entail social obligations.8 This Article highlights another social dimension of
property, one that is often overlooked. Namely, ownership can be inclusive,
rather than exclusive; it can facilitate cooperation, not just result in conflict;
and it frequently promotes human sociability, not atomistic individualism.
Part I surveys recent debates about exclusion and then distinguishes the
nonowner’s right to be included from an owner’s right to include. Part II
discusses why it is difficult to achieve the benefits of inclusion—sharing,
exchange, financing, risk-spreading, and specialization—while preventing
opportunism and other costs of inclusion. Part III compares the ways in which
owners may include others: informal, contractual, and proprietary inclusion. In
distinguishing among these alternative forms of inclusion, Part III explores
why each of the forms is instrumental in facilitating the social use of property.
4 See MERGES, supra note 2, at 295 (“[T]he supposedly exclusive right of property is actually bound up
with various forms of inclusion.”); THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 449 (2d ed. 2012) (“[I]t is important not only to be able to exclude other persons from the thing, but
also to be able to include other persons in the use and enjoyment of the thing . . . .”); J.E. PENNER, THE IDEA OF
PROPERTY IN LAW 75 (1997) (“[U]nderstanding the social use of property . . . must be as fundamental to
understanding property as understanding the way in which property excludes.”).
5 Cf. James Penner, Ownership, Co-ownership, and the Justification of Property Rights, in PROPERTIES
OF LAW 166, 166 (Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2006) (arguing that “justification of ownership per se depends
upon the premise that property will generally be shared or co-owned”).
6 Cf. Gregory S. Alexander, Governance Property, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 1853, 1856–57, 1860 (2012)
(delineating several types of “governance property” but noting the analysis “provides only a brief look
at . . . some of the major [governance property] institutions in modern society”).
7 See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 1 (1960); see also J.J. Laffont,
Externalities, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 192–93 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence
E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008) (discussing how production and consumption can create negative externalities).
8 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 745, 746–48 (2009); Hanoch Dagan, The Social Responsibility of Ownership, 92 CORNELL L. REV.
1255, 1255–56 (2007); Joseph William Singer, Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic
Society, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1009, 1048 (2009).
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Each form plays a unique role in deterring opportunism and facilitating
cooperation. Part IV suggests that understanding an owner’s right to include
others helps to illuminate several recent debates in property theory.
I. EXCLUSION AND INCLUSION
A. Excluding Others from Property
One justification for property is that, by creating exclusive rights, property
promotes the efficient use of resources.9 This justification has several aspects.
First, property may provide individuals with incentives to work.10 Without
property rights, the private incentive to work may diverge from what is socially
optimal because a person considers that her output may be taken.11 By contrast,
with property rights, a person receives the output she produces and has an
incentive to work the optimal amount.12 Second, property provides incentives
to maintain and improve things.13 If a person obtains the gains of maintaining
and improving her property, she will do so consistent with what is socially
optimal.14 Third, without a right to exclude, a person will devote resources to
prevent the taking of her things, and other parties will waste their time and
money attempting to take these things.15 In short, exclusion is said to promote
the optimal use of resources and to prevent wasteful disputes.16
Historically, in analyzing property, many jurists have emphasized the role
of exclusion. For example, William Blackstone’s understanding of property—
as a right to a thing good against the world—involves a robust concept of

9 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 347,
356 (1967).
10 STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 11 (2004).
11 Id. at 11–15 (providing numerical examples).
12
Id. at 15.
13 Id. at 16.
14 See id. at 16–18; Dean Lueck & Thomas J. Miceli, Property Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND
ECONOMICS 183, 192 (A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (“[P]rivate ownership . . . creates
incentives for optimal asset maintenance and investment.”).
15 See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 20.
16 See Demsetz, supra note 9, at 348, 354–56 (describing the evolution of property rights and arguing
that a “primary function of property rights is that of guiding incentives to achieve a greater internalization of
externalities”); Robert C. Ellickson, Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1322–32 (1993) (discussing
advantages of individual ownership and arguing that “the parcelization of land is a relatively low-transactioncost method of inducing people to ‘do the right thing’ with the earth’s surface”).
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exclusion.17 For Blackstone, property was useful for preventing disputes as
well as providing incentives to work.18 Given Blackstone’s influence on
American law, this understanding of property—as a right to a thing good
against the world—was predominant among lawyers and judges until the early
twentieth century.19 Understanding property as a thing is also consistent with
how most nonlawyers conceptualize ownership.20
As Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have observed, this idea of property
declined during much of the twentieth century.21 The writings of Wesley
Hohfeld,22 and the advent of legal realism,23 contributed to its decline and to
the rise of a competing view—the idea of property as a “bundle of rights.”24
Ultimately, as Merrill and Smith explain, the bundle-of-rights view became “a
kind of orthodoxy” in law schools.25 Moreover, Ronald Coase and other early
figures in law and economics “did not question the realists’ conception of
property as a contingent bundle of rights.”26 Even with the ascendancy of this

17 See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2 (describing “the right of property” as “that sole and
despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion
of the right of any other individual in the universe”).
18 See id. at *7–8.
19 On the views of other theorists, in addition to Blackstone, see SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 22 & n.13,
discussing Hobbes, Locke, and Bentham; and Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, What Happened to
Property in Law and Economics?, 111 YALE L.J. 357, 360–64 (2001), discussing Hobbes, Smith, and
Bentham.
20 See BRUCE ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 98–100 (1977) (stating that
laypersons view property as thing ownership); Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegration of Property, in PROPERTY
69, 69 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds., 1980) (“Most people, including most specialists in their
unprofessional moments, conceive of property as things that are owned by persons.”).
21 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 364–66.
22 On Hohfeld, see J.E. Penner, Hohfeldian Use-Rights in Property, in PROPERTY PROBLEMS: FROM
GENES TO PENSION FUNDS 164–74 (J.W. Harris ed., 1997); and Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights
Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 986–94, 1056–59. For
earlier analysis of Hohfeld, see generally Walter Wheeler Cook, Hohfeld’s Contributions to the Science of
Law, 28 YALE L.J. 721 (1919); and Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141 (1938).
23 On legal realism, see generally Brian Leiter, Legal Realism, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
AND LEGAL THEORY 261, 261–79 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
24 On property as a bundle of rights, see ACKERMAN, supra note 20, at 26–29; Grey, supra note 20, at
69–71; Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 360–66; and J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of
Property, 43 UCLA L. REV. 711 (1996). Although “Hohfeld did not use the metaphor ‘bundle of rights’ to
describe property,” Hohfeld’s legal “theory of jural opposites and correlatives,” coupled with his analysis of in
rem rights, “provided the intellectual justification for this metaphor, which became popular among the legal
realists in the 1920s and 1930s.” Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 365.
25 Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 365.
26 Id. at 366; see also Emily Sherwin, Two- and Three-Dimensional Property Rights, 29 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1075, 1078 (1997) (“[F]rom Hohfeld and Coase it is an easy step to say that property rights are simply rights,
to which the term ‘property’ adds nothing at all.”).
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bundle-of-rights view, most courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
continue to acknowledge the right to exclude as one of the most important
rights in the bundle.27
Recently, there has been renewed interest in the nature of property and the
right to exclude. James Penner has argued that “the right to property is a right
to exclude others from things which is grounded by the interest we have in the
use of things.”28 Likewise, Merrill and Smith have attempted to revitalize the
idea that “property at its core entails the right to exclude others from some
discrete thing.”29 These property theorists have attempted to emphasize that
exclusion is “not an end in itself”30 but rather the “practical means” by which
an interest in the “use of property” is protected.31 However, their work has
provoked a number of debates about the nature and purpose of property
rights.32
Historically, many prominent intellectuals have had a more pessimistic
view about the effects of private property on social interaction. For Karl Marx,
property entails each person attempting “to find satisfaction of his own selfish
need” and thus “every new product represents a new potentiality of mutual
swindling and mutual plundering.”33 Marx’s objective was to transcend private
property in order to return to a “social” existence: “The positive transcendence
of private property as the appropriation of human life, is therefore the positive
transcendence of all estrangement—that is to say, the return of man . . . to his
human, i.e., social, existence.”34 For this reason, in the Communist Manifesto,
27 See, e.g., Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 539 (2005) (declaring that the “right to exclude
others from entering and using her property” is “perhaps the most fundamental of all property interests”);
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“The power to exclude has
traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.”);
Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 179–80 (1979) (characterizing the “right to exclude” as being
“universally held to be a fundamental element of the property right” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
28 PENNER, supra note 4, at 71 (italics removed).
29 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at vii; see also id. at 449; accord Thomas W. Merrill, Property and
the Right to Exclude, 77 NEB. L. REV. 730, 742–43 (1998).
30 Henry E. Smith, Mind the Gap: The Indirect Relation Between Ends and Means in American Property
Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 959, 964 (2009).
31 PENNER, supra note 4, at 68–74 (discussing the connection between exclusion and use).
32 See, e.g., Daniel B. Klein & John Robinson, Property: A Bundle of Rights? Prologue to the Property
Symposium, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193, 194–96 (2011); see also infra notes 37–38.
33 KARL MARX, Human Requirements and Division of Labour Under the Rule of Private Property, in
ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, at 101, 101–02 (Progress Publishers trans., 5th ed. 1977)
(italics removed).
34 KARL MARX, Private Property and Labour. Political Economy as a Product of the Movement of
Private Property, in ECONOMIC AND PHILOSOPHIC MANUSCRIPTS OF 1844, supra note 33, at 83, 91.

2014]

THE RIGHT TO INCLUDE

865

Marx and Friedrich Engels call for the abolition of private property.35 Today,
few scholars advocate abolishing private property entirely. But there remains a
certain degree of skepticism about the role of property in a market economy,
especially as economic inequality, commercial exploitation, and environmental
degradation have not ceased (and, in some ways, accelerated) since Marx.36
Thus, there is currently a robust debate over the significance of exclusion.
Descriptively, many scholars disagree over whether the right to exclude is the
organizing principle of property law, one right within the bundle of rights, or
something else.37 Normatively, scholars continue to disagree about the extent
to which robust private property rights can be consistent with authentic social
interaction and human flourishing.38 Despite such disagreements, the unifying
feature of this literature is its focus on the relative importance of exclusion as

35 KARL MARX & FRIEDRICH ENGELS, THE COMMUNIST MANIFESTO 67 (Penguin Books 1998) (1848)
(“[P]rivate property is the final and most complete expression of the system of producing and appropriating
products, that is based on class antagonisms, on the exploitation of the many by the few. In this sense, the
theory of the Communists may be summed up in the single sentence: Abolition of private property.”).
36 See, e.g., Thomas Piketty & Emmanuel Saez, The Evolution of Top Incomes: A Historical and
International Perspective, 96 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 200 (2006) (discussing economic inequality);
Samson Imasogie Omofonmwan & Lucky Osaretin Odia, Oil Exploitation and Conflict in the Niger-Delta
Region of Nigeria, 26 J. HUM. ECOLOGY 25 (2009) (discussing commercial exploitation and environmental
degradation).
37
See generally Symposium, Property: A Bundle of Rights?, 8 ECON J. WATCH 193 (2011) (compiling
essays both defending and critiquing the bundle-of-rights view); Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Demystifying the
Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 593, 593
(2008) (describing the right to exclude as the correlative of a duty of nonowners to stay away from property,
which “derives from the norm of inviolability, a defining feature of social existence”); Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, A Theory of Property, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 531, 531 (2005) (“propos[ing] a unified
theory of property predicated on the insight that property law is organized around creating and defending the
value inherent in stable ownership”); Larissa Katz, Exclusion and Exclusivity in Property Law, 58 U.
TORONTO L.J. 275, 275 (2008) (arguing the central concern of property law is not the exclusion of nonowners,
but rather maintaining the owner “as the exclusive agenda setter for the owned thing”); Adam Mossoff, What
Is Property? Putting the Pieces Back Together, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 371, 439 (2003) (offering an “integrated
theory” in which property “comprises the exclusive rights to acquire, use and dispose of one’s possessions”);
Eric R. Claeys, Response, Exclusion and Private Law Theory: A Comment on Property as the Law of Things,
125 HARV. L. REV. F. 133, 143 (2012), http://www.harvardlawreview.org/media/pdf/forvol125_claeys.pdf
(advancing a philosophical, rather than economic, view of property in which “property’s exclusivity is always
calibrated to property’s legitimate use or use-determination”).
38 Compare Alexander, supra note 8, at 747–48 (“The core image of property rights . . . is that the owner
has a right to exclude others and owes no further obligation to them. . . . The law has relegated the social
obligations of owners to the margins, while individual rights, such as the right to exclude, have occupied the
center stage.”), with Smith, supra note 30, at 963 (“[Alexander] laments that social obligation appears only
implicitly in property law and that there is a ‘gap’ between property law and human flourishing. I will
argue . . . that far from being problems, this implicitness and gappiness is the strength of a property law that
promotes flourishing.”).

866

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:857

the basis of property rights, with little discussion of an owner’s right to include
others.
B. Including Others in Property
Property not only involves exclusion but also entails inclusion. Inclusion
may be involuntary, i.e., a nonowner’s right to be included, or voluntary, i.e.,
an owner’s right to include.39
1. Involuntary Inclusion
Several criticisms of the right to exclude focus on competing claims by
others to use, possess, or enjoy an owner’s property. For example, in Property:
Values and Institutions, Hanoch Dagan argues against the “trend of exclusioncentrism in property.”40 In a chapter entitled “Exclusion and Inclusion in
Property,” Dagan contends that “property neither is nor should be solely about
exclusion or exclusivity and that, at times, inclusion is part of what property is
rather than external to its core.”41 Dagan is correct in saying that exclusion is
not the end of the story. But what Dagan means by “inclusion” is different than
what this Article means by the right to include.
Dagan is investigating a nonowner’s right of access, i.e., the right to be
included.42 He illustrates his argument with examples drawn from public
accommodations law, fair use in copyright law, and the Fair Housing Act.43
Each of these examples, like access in general, is a vital topic within property.
Accordingly, there is a fairly well-developed literature examining situations in
which a legal rule of exclusion conflicts with a public policy favoring
inclusion,44 and many examples in which a nonowner’s right to be included
trumps an owner’s right to exclude.

39

Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Two Cheers for the Bundle of Sticks Metaphor, Three Cheers for Merrill and
Smith, 8 ECON J. WATCH 215, 218 (2011) (“A well-designed private property system . . . must enable many
forms of consensual, and sometimes even nonconsensual, decomposition.”).
40 HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 38 (2011).
41 Id. at 48.
42 Id. at 44–45 (discussing “The Right to be Included” and “categories of cases where property law
vindicates the right of nonowners to be included”).
43 See id. at 48–54.
44 See, e.g., EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS,
PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (2010); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER,
ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF PROPERTY (2000); Alexander, supra note 8; Dagan, supra note 8; Singer,
supra note 8.
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As Blackstone himself acknowledges, an owner’s right to exclude is not
absolute.45 For example, a person may enter upon another’s land based on
necessity to preserve human life.46 Likewise, hunters have long held a right to
enter unenclosed lands;47 indeed, a few American states, as well as many
European nations, recognize a right of access for hunters, and about half the
states require owners to post signs on the border of their property to exclude
hunters.48 Commercial airlines fly their planes over millions of parcels,49 even
though doing so would be a trespass under the ad coelum rule.50 Moreover, in
two well-known cases on the right to exclude, State v. Shack and PruneYard v.
Robins, courts privileged the nonowners’ interest in access over the owners’
interest in exclusion.51 Plus, public accommodations and antidiscrimination
law are widely recognized as important limitations on the right to exclude.52
Similarly, in intellectual property (IP) law, nonowners often assert a right
to be included. In copyright law, the fair use exception is a limitation on an
author’s right to exclude others from copying an original work.53 In patent law,
compulsory licensing is premised on a claim that a potential licensee has the
45

See J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric and Practice of Rights in America,
98 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 290 (2010) (noting that, “[a]fter describing property rights as exclusive,” Blackstone
utilizes “five hundred pages describing various situations in which property rights properly yielded to
community interests”).
46 See, e.g., Ploof v. Putnam, 71 A. 188, 189 (Vt. 1908); see also Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124
N.W. 221, 222 (Minn. 1910).
47 See, e.g., McConico v. Singleton, 9 S.C.L. (2 Mill) 244 (1818).
48 See Mark R. Sigmon, Note, Hunting and Posting on Private Land in America, 54 DUKE L.J. 549, 558–
64 (2004) (describing current laws regarding hunting on private land); see also Richard M. Hynes, Posted:
Notice and the Right to Exclude, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 949, 952 n.10, 955–56 (2013).
49 See Hinman v. Pac. Air Transp., 84 F.2d 755, 756 (9th Cir. 1936).
50 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 13–15.
51 PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 82–84 (1980) (holding that a state limitation on a
shopping mall owner’s right to exclude individuals engaged in political speech did not constitute an
unconstitutional taking of the owner’s property); State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369, 371–72, 374 (N.J. 1971)
(holding that a health worker and staff attorney, who had entered a farm to speak with migrant workers living
and working on the farm, did not commit a “trespass” because “ownership of real property does not include the
right to bar access to governmental services available to migrant workers”).
52 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2006) (prohibiting “discrimination or segregation in places of public
accommodation”); id. § 3604 (prohibiting “discrimination in the sale or rental of housing” on the basis of race,
color, religion, sex, family status, national origin, as well as disability). On public accommodations, see
generally A.K. Sandoval-Strausz, Travelers, Strangers, and Jim Crow: Law, Public Accommodations, and
Civil Rights in America, 23 LAW & HIST. REV. 53 (2005); and Joseph William Singer, No Right to Exclude:
Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996).
53 See Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection: A Price Theory
Explanation, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 454–55 (2002); Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as
Property: Delineating Entitlements in Information, 116 YALE L.J. 1742, 1812 (2007) (“[T]he doctrine of fair
use is another limitation on copyright.”).
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right to be included in using a drug or invention.54 More broadly, in advocating
for an expansion of the public domain, many IP scholars emphasize the rights
of users to be included.55
Overall, the right of access is central in many areas of property and IP law.
Furthermore, several leading property scholars, including Gregory Alexander,
Hanoch Dagan, and Joseph Singer, outline theories that explain, justify, and
promote inclusion in this sense.56 However, there are clear differences between
a nonowner’s right to be included and the owner’s right to include, and these
differences deserve independent consideration.
2. Voluntary Inclusion
Owners often include others in their property. Yet, unlike the right to
exclude or the right to be included, neither courts nor commentators have
focused much on the right to include. In delineating the bundle of rights that
characterizes property, courts have not identified the right to include as a
distinct attribute of ownership.57 Moreover, in defining property, many
casebooks do not mention, or only briefly mention, the right to include.58
Overall, the focus of most courts and commentators is on other attributes of
property, such as the right to exclude, transfer, possess, or use.59 To date, there
is no systematic effort to investigate the right to include and its implications.
54 See, e.g., Donald Harris, TRIPS After Fifteen Years: Success or Failure, as Measured by Compulsory
Licensing, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 383 & n.72 (2011); Subhasis Saha, Patent Law and TRIPS: Compulsory
Licensing of Patents and Pharmaceuticals, 91 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 364, 366–67 (2009).
55 See, e.g., L. RAY PATTERSON & STANLEY W. LINDBERG, THE NATURE OF COPYRIGHT: A LAW OF
USERS’ RIGHTS 14–15 (1991); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints
on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 354, 359 (1999).
56 See generally DAGAN, supra note 40, at 44 (“[P]roperty values . . . necessitate the incorporation of
some dimension of social responsibility into the concept of property . . . .”); SINGER, supra note 44, at 18
(“[T]here is no core of property we can define that leaves owners free to ignore entirely the interests of
others.”); Alexander, supra note 8 (proposing a social-obligation theory of property, in which people have an
obligation to promote human flourishing in their communities, which could extend to an obligation to share).
57
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982) (“Property rights
in a physical thing have been described as the rights ‘to possess, use and dispose of it.’” (quoting United States
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945))); Kafka v. Montana Dept. of Fish, Wildlife & Parks, 2008
MT 460, ¶ 33, 348 Mont. 80, 201 P.3d 8 (defining property as “rights to exclude, use, transfer, or dispose of
the property” (quoting Members of the Peanut Quota Holders Ass’n v. United States, 421 F.3d 1323, 1330
(Fed. Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation mark omitted)).
58 See, e.g., JOHN G. SPRANKLING, UNDERSTANDING PROPERTY LAW 4–5 (2d ed. 2007) (“[T]he most
important sticks in the bundle are: (1) the right to exclude; (2) the right to transfer; and (3) the right to possess
and use.” (footnote omitted)); see also infra notes 61, 63 (citing casebooks by Thomas Merrill & Henry Smith
and by Jesse Dukeminier et al., both of which mention an owner’s right to include).
59 See supra notes 57–58.
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Recently, several scholars, while emphasizing the right to exclude as the
unifying or essential feature of property, have hinted that there may be another,
related concept just beneath the surface. Specifically, a handful of scholars,
including Penner, Merrill and Smith, and Merges, emphasize the fact that
owners have the ability to include others. Penner uses the analogy of the
gatekeeper to suggest that owners can include as well as exclude: “The right to
property is like a gate, not a wall.”60 Likewise, Merrill and Smith compare
owners to gatekeepers in noting that “it is important not only to be able to
exclude other persons from the thing, but also to be able to include other
persons in the use and enjoyment of the thing.”61
Neither Penner nor Merrill and Smith adopt the realist perspective of
property as a bundle of rights.62 But some realists, including Felix Cohen, also
hypothesize that property entails not just the ability to exclude but also the
power to “grant permission” to use something.63 Moreover, several scholars,
including Robert Ellickson, have argued that one of the virtues of the “bundle
of rights” or “bundle of sticks” metaphor is that it highlights “an owner’s
powers to transfer particular sticks in a bundle” and thereby include others.64
This idea of inclusion arises in intellectual, as well as real, property.
Merges contends that analyzing “a typical property right (including especially
most IP rights) reveals all sorts of ways that the supposedly exclusive right of
property is actually bound up with various forms of inclusion.”65 Merges
describes inclusion as not enforcing or waiving IP rights.66 For example, if a
firm owns a patent that is being infringed, the firm can decide not to enforce its
patent. Similarly, if a firm wants to provide life-saving drugs to individuals in a
developing nation, the firm can waive its IP rights. Merges advocates a “robust
‘right to include,’” which he says is “coextensive with the traditional right to
60

PENNER, supra note 4, at 74.
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 449; see also Merrill, supra note 29, at 742–44; Henry E. Smith,
Property as the Law of Things, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1691, 1710 (2012).
62
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 360; Penner, supra note 24, at 714–15; see also Ellickson,
supra note 39, at 216 (describing Merrill and Smith as “the leading critics of the bundle metaphor”).
63 See Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property, 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 372 (1954) (“Without
freedom to bar one man from a certain activity and to allow another man to engage in that activity we would
have no property.”); see also JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 88 (7th ed. 2010) (describing Cohen’s idea
of property as “a relationship among people that entitles so-called owners to include (that is, permit) or exclude
(that is, deny) use or possession of the owned property by other people”).
64 Ellickson, supra note 39, at 218 & n.4; see also Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual
Property? A Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 464 (2010).
65 MERGES, supra note 2, at 295.
66 See id. at 286, 295.
61
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exclude at the heart of IP and property generally.”67 He concludes that this
“ability to easily include is an important flip side to the grant of property
rights.”68
However, except for brief treatments by Penner, Merrill and Smith, and
Merges, the property theory literature has not focused much on an owner’s
right to include others. Moreover, the literature on the economic analysis of
property has not investigated the social advantages and disadvantages of
dividing property rights, with a few notable exceptions.69 Instead, most
scholars have focused almost exclusively on the costs, rather than the benefits,
of fragmentation.70 Yet, as Part II suggests, the benefits of inclusion are an
important, albeit underexplored, dimension of property.
II. ON THE SOCIAL DESIRABILITY OF INCLUSION
To illustrate why inclusion is socially beneficial, consider a thought
experiment. Imagine a world in which (a) you cannot include others in the use,
possession, or enjoyment of your property and (b) others cannot include you in
their property. Such a world—atomistic, isolated, and exclusive—differs
dramatically from the interrelated and inclusive world in which we live, work,

67

Id. at 290–91.
Id. at 296.
69 See generally SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 27–32 (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of
property division); Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement to Facilitate
Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027, 1029 (1995) (arguing that “[d]ividing a legal entitlement between
rivalrous users can facilitate efficient trade”); Jeffrey Evans Stake, Decomposition of Property Rights, in 2
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 32 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De Geest eds., 2000)
(summarizing literature on the division of property into less than full ownership interests). In a forthcoming
work, I discuss under what circumstances an owner’s private incentive to divide property diverges from the
socially optimal division. See Daniel B. Kelly, Dividing Possessory Rights, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF
POSSESSION (Yun-Chien Chang ed., forthcoming 2014).
70 See MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS,
STOPS INNOVATION AND COSTS LIVES, at xvi (2008); Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons:
Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 623–26 (1998); Michael A. Heller
& Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280
SCIENCE 698, 698 (1998); see also Francesco Parisi, Entropy in Property, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 595, 595–96
(2002); Francesco Parisi, Freedom of Contract and the Laws of Entropy, 10 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 65, 65
(2003). Excessive fragmentation is a particularly salient issue in the wake of the mortgage crisis. See, e.g.,
David A. Dana, The Foreclosure Crisis and the Antifragmentation Principle in State Property Law, 77 U. CHI.
L. REV. 97, 97 (2010); Note, The Perils of Fragmentation and Reckless Innovation, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1799,
1800 (2012).
68
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and play. Inclusion is critical because human beings depend upon each other,
not only to survive but also to flourish.71
Yet an owner’s decision about whether to include another party entails a
dilemma. Although inclusion can be highly beneficial, it creates a danger of
strategic behavior and conflicts over use. How to maximize the benefits of
inclusion, while minimizing its potential costs, is the key to unlocking the
dilemma. To this end, Part II.A examines the benefits of inclusion, including
sharing, exchange, financing, risk-spreading, and specialization. Part II.B
analyzes some of the primary costs of inclusion: coordination disputes,
strategic behavior, and conflicts over use.
A. Social Benefits of Inclusion
1. Sharing
Most individuals or families, in ancient as well as modern times, own
relatively little property. Inclusion can therefore emerge out of necessity, e.g.,
obtaining permission to hunt on another’s land,72 renting a field to grow
crops,73 or sharing subsistence harvests.74 Inclusion through sharing is
ubiquitous across cultures. Anthropologists and ethnographers have
documented the role that “hosting” (i.e., inviting others into one’s home) plays
all over the world and throughout history.75
Similarly, a recent article entitled “Is Civilization the Result of Humans’
Need to Share?,” reports on how a study in Science “shows that young human
children perform as well as apes on intelligence tests, but that kids beat apes in

71 See GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY: COMPETING VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN
AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970, at 1–2 (1997) (characterizing human persons as “inevitably
dependent on others not only to thrive but even just to survive”); Penner, supra note 5, at 185 (“Humans, qua
humans, depend upon co-operative activity to survive as a matter of their very nature . . . .”).
72
See Sigmon, supra note 48, at 552–58.
73 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 649.
74 See, e.g., Hannah B. Loon, Sharing: You Are Never Alone in a Village, ALASKA FISH & GAME, Nov.–
Dec. 1989, at 34, 36 (discussing various kinds of equitable, charitable, and ceremonial sharing of subsistence
harvests in Inupiaq Eskimo villages).
75 See, e.g., Harumi Befu, An Ethnography of Dinner Entertainment in Japan, 11 ARCTIC
ANTHROPOLOGY (SUPPLEMENT) 196 (1974) (discussing the rituals that accompany hosting dinner guests);
Russell Zanca, “Take! Take! Take!” Host–Guest Relations and All That Food: Uzbek Hospitality Past and
Present, ANTHROPOLOGY E. EUR. REV., Spring 2003, at 8; see also ADAM YUET CHAU, MIRACULOUS
RESPONSE: DOING POPULAR RELIGION IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA 126 (2006) (“Hosting is arguably the most
important social activity for Shaanbei people.”).
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social skills.”76 The article speculates that “this human need to voluntarily
share is why we have language” and also may “explain blogs, YouTube, and
social networking.”77 Indeed, in recent years, many people have participated in
the “sharing economy,” in which renters use the Internet to connect with
owners who are renting their spare rooms (on Airbnb), cars (on RelayRides),
or other assets that are being less than fully utilized.78 Finally, as economists
have pointed out, sharing can be the result of either self-interest or altruism.79
For example, even a profit-maximizing firm may share its resources with
developing countries by waiving IP rights to life-saving drugs.80
Sharing is socially beneficial if the benefits to a donor and donee outweigh
the social costs. However, the private incentive to share may diverge from the
socially optimal level of sharing because, even if donors are altruistic and
benefit from an increase in the happiness of donees, donors may not take into
account that this benefit to donees is itself relevant to social welfare.81 As a
result, unless a donor’s motivation is to maximize social welfare, rather than
the donor’s own self-interest, the private incentive to include others for
purposes of sharing may diverge from what is socially optimal.82

76 Christie Nicholson, Is Civilization the Result of Humans’ Need to Share?, SCI. AM. (May 27, 2008),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/podcast/episode.cfm?id=2BA90A6B-C679-1D75-05835D9B22FE24FC
(discussing Esther Hermann et al., Humans Have Evolved Specialized Skills of Social Cognition: The Cultural
Intelligence Hypothesis, 317 SCIENCE 1360 (2007)).
77 Id.
78 The Rise of the Sharing Economy: On the Internet, Everything Is for Hire, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2013,
at 53. See generally RACHEL BOSTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE OF
COLLABORATIVE CONSUMPTION (2010).
79 On self-interested or “warm-glow” giving, see generally SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 58 (“[T]he act of
giving itself may supply utility to the donor, independently of the degree of satisfaction it renders the donee.”).
James Andreoni, Impure Altruism and Donations to Public Goods: A Theory of Warm-Glow Giving, 100
ECON. J. 464 (1990) (describing utility from giving itself as a “warm glow”). On altruistic giving, see generally
Joseph G. Altonji et al., Parental Altruism and Inter Vivos Transfers: Theory and Evidence, 105 J. POL. ECON.
1121, 1122 (1997) (“Two motives compete to explain family exchange: altruism and self-interest.”); Steven
Shavell, An Economic Analysis of Altruism and Deferred Gifts, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 401 (1991) (discussing
economic rationale motivating donors and deferred giving).
80 See, e.g., Sarah Boseley, Glaxo Offers Free Access to Potential Malaria Cures, GUARDIAN (U.K.),
Jan. 20, 2010, http://www.theguardian.com/science/2010/jan/20/glaxo-malaria-drugs-public-domain; Russell
Williams, Editorial, Drug Firms Proud of Their Work Globally, TORONTO STAR, July 29, 2009, at A18. See
generally M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 571 (2009) (discussing corporate philanthropy and examining the role that corporations
should play in satisfying the demand for altruism).
81 See Louis Kaplow, A Note on Subsidizing Gifts, 58 J. PUB. ECON. 469, 469–70 (1995) (discussing
positive externality in giving).
82 See id.
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2. Exchange
Unlike sharing, which entails a gratuitous transfer, exchange entails a
transfer with consideration. Exchange is fundamental to a market economy
because, through voluntary agreements, resources move from low-value to
high-value users.83 The future exchange of goods and services requires
contracts. Thus, A agrees to a contract with B, and B agrees to a contract with
A, only if A and B believe they will benefit from their agreement.84
Consider several types of exchange, each of which entails inclusion. In a
residential lease, a landlord remains the owner of an apartment but transfers
possession of the apartment to a tenant. The landlord benefits from receiving
the rent; the tenant benefits from having a place to live.85 By selling tickets,
i.e., revocable licenses, the owner of a stadium permits spectators to enter the
arena. The owner benefits from selling the tickets; fans pay for a chance to
watch the concert or game.86 Finally, in an IP licensing agreement, a firm
maintains ownership of its IP rights but allows consumers or other firms to use
the information or idea.87 The firm obtains a licensing fee; the licensees benefit
from having access to the intellectual property rights.88
In short, the exchange function of inclusion allows parties to enter into
various kinds of mutually beneficial agreements regarding property without
requiring complete alienation. Of course, if the law did not enforce such
agreements, parties might engage in fewer exchanges. Moreover, exchange is a

83 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 39 (8th ed. 2011); see also Benjamin E.
Hermalin, Avery E. Katz & Richard Craswell, Contract Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS, supra
note 14, at 3, 7 (“The essence of a free-market economy is the ability of private parties to enter into voluntary
agreements that govern the economic exchange between them.”).
84 See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF CONTRACT LAW 2 (1979);
see also SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 296 (discussing “the mutual desirability of a contract”).
85 See Ellickson, supra note 16, at 1372; cf. Louis De Alessi, Gains from Private Property: The
Empirical Evidence, in PROPERTY RIGHTS: COOPERATION, CONFLICT, AND LAW 90, 102 (Terry L. Anderson &
Fred S. McChesney eds., 2003) (“Voluntary renting and leasing are prevalent usufruct arrangements that
facilitate the bundling of resource rights and their flow to higher-valued users.”).
86 A study estimates that over 277 million tickets were sold in the United States in 2005 for professional
sports events and NCAA football and men’s basketball games. See Brad R. Humphreys & Jane E. Ruseski,
Estimates of the Dimensions of the Sports Market in the US, 4 INT’L J. OF SPORT FIN. 94, 100–01 (2009).
87 See WILLIAM E. O’BRIEN ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LICENSING AGREEMENTS § 2, at 2 (2d ed.
2012) (“A license is defined as a grant of rights by an owner of intellectual property to use, make, have made,
or sell the owner’s intellectual property.”).
88 See id. (“A license agreement enables the owner and licensor to share technology or intellectual
property with a licensee in exchange for compensation while retaining and controlling ownership of the
licensed materials.”).
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broad term that includes several types of mutually beneficial activities,
including financing, risk-sharing, and specialization.
3. Financing
Financing is also instrumental in a market economy. One method of
financing is a loan from a lender to a borrower. The borrower obtains the loan
and, in return, promises to repay the lender (usually, with interest). The
borrower may pledge collateral as security against the debt. A security interest,
including a mortgage, is itself a type of inclusion.89 But other forms of
inclusion also serve this financing function.
Historically, leases served as a financing device. In discussing ancient land
law, Robert Ellickson and Charles Thorland point out that “[a]nthropological
evidence indicates that members of preindustrial societies tend to engage in
land-leasing at an earlier stage than land-selling.”90 Ellickson and Thorland
maintain that “[r]ental arrangements respond to land-occupancy demands of
relatively transitory or capital-poor persons.”91 Likewise, as Edward Glaeser
and others have documented, the lease was a way of circumventing the
prohibition on usury.92 Indeed, before the emergence of capital markets, leases
served as a financing device for farmers93 as well as early entrepreneurs.94
Similarly, today’s consumers, especially consumers with few assets or poor
credit, may prefer to lease, rather than buy, property for the sake of financing.95

89 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 808 (“Security interests can be seen as another form of divided
ownership.”). On security interests in property law, see generally Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy as Property Law,
in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW 206 (Kenneth Ayotte & Henry E. Smith eds.,
2011), discussing how claims against assets in bankruptcy implicate property law.
90 Robert C. Ellickson & Charles DiA. Thorland, Ancient Land Law: Mesopotamia, Egypt, Israel, 71
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 321, 369 (1995) (citing FREDERIC L. PRYOR, THE ORIGINS OF THE ECONOMY: A
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DISTRIBUTION IN PRIMITIVE AND PEASANT ECONOMIES 143 (1977)).
91 Id.; see also Arthur R. Gaudio, Wyoming’s Residential Rental Property Act—A Critical Review, 35
LAND & WATER L. REV. 455, 458 (2000) (“One of the initial uses of the leasehold estate was as a financing
device for persons in need of funds.”).
92 See Edward L. Glaeser & José Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be: An Economic
Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 J.L. & ECON. 1, 25 (1998); see also MERRILL & SMITH,
supra note 4, at 648; Mary B. Spector, Tenants’ Rights, Procedural Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the
Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 135, 142 (2000).
93 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 649.
94 See THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 572−73 (5th ed. 1956);
Gaudio, supra note 91, at 458.
95 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 649; see also Spector, supra note 92, at 144 n.21 (“[P]arties
negotiate leases as a means of obtaining financing . . . .”).
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Several types of leases, including ground leases and sale-leasebacks, are wellestablished financing devices.96 Likewise, if a person needs a new car, the
person can buy the car (and finance the purchase with a loan) or, alternatively,
lease the car.97 The lease is also a common device for financing the purchase of
aircraft.98
Other forms of inclusion also serve as financing devices. Licenses are
instrumental in financing various types of intellectual property rights,
including rights in motion pictures.99 Mortgage trusts are “a useful mechanism
for real estate financing,” and, “[w]ithout [such] trusts, it would be impossible
to explain the expansion of the U.S. housing market after World War II.”100
Partnerships also facilitate financing and can sometimes serve as an alternative
to a secured loan.101
4. Risk-Spreading
Inclusion also enables both owners and nonowners to reduce certain types
of risk. Spreading risk is socially beneficial if parties are risk averse. Parties
may attempt to mitigate their exposure to risk in various ways, including
diversification and insurance.102 Yet another mechanism for mitigating risk is
inclusion.

96 See Gregory M. Stein, Mortgage Law in China: Comparing Theory and Practice, 72 MO. L. REV.
1315, 1332 (2007) (describing how the ground lease “functions as a financing device”); see generally Marvin
Milich, The Real Estate Sale-Leaseback Transaction: A View Toward the 90s, 21 REAL EST. L.J. 66 (1992)
(exploring the advantages and disadvantages of the sale-leaseback as a financing device).
97 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 650 (“Auto leasing . . . is clearly a financing device, and
functions as a substitute for purchasing an auto with a loan secured by a lien on the auto.”).
98 See Michael Downey Rice, Current Issues in Aircraft Finance, 56 J. AIR L. & COM. 1027, 1032 (1991)
(“Lease financing of aircraft is often viewed as the alternative to ‘straight’ debt financing.”).
99 See, e.g., Lorin Brennan, Financing Intellectual Property Under Revised Article 9: National and
International Conflicts, 23 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 313, 444 (2001) (explaining that the financing of
motion pictures “illustrates prototypical intellectual property financing, with tiers of exclusive and nonexclusive licenses”).
100 Dante Figueroa, Civil Law Trusts in Latin America: Is the Lack of Trusts an Impediment for
Expanding Business Opportunities in Latin America?, 24 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 701, 750 (2007)
(describing mortgage trusts).
101 See generally Robert H. Scarborough, Partnerships as an Alternative to Secured Loans, 58 TAX LAW.
509, 512 (2005) (“analyz[ing] current law treatment of partnership structures resembling secured financings”);
see also Glaeser & Scheinkman, supra note 92, at 25 (discussing a “number of subtle mechanisms used . . . to
avoid the usury ban” including limited partnerships).
102 On the role of diversification, see HARRY M. MARKOWITZ, PORTFOLIO SELECTION: EFFICIENT
DIVERSIFICATION OF INVESTMENTS 5 (2d ed. 1991). On the role of insurance, see GEORGE E. REJDA,
PRINCIPLES OF RISK MANAGEMENT AND INSURANCE 20 (11th ed. 2011).
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The risk-sharing function of inclusion is not a modern phenomenon.
Ellickson and Thorland posit that another reason that members of preindustrial
societies may have engaged in land leases, even prior to land sales, is that
leases serve to spread risks.103 They point out that one of the “two principal
theories for the widespread use of sharecropping throughout human history” is
that “its risk-splitting feature appeals to cultivators, who are assumed to be
more risk-averse than landlords.”104 Indeed, in a seminal contribution to the
economic analysis of law, The Theory of Share Tenancy, Steven Cheung
describes sharecropping as a risk-sharing device.105
Today, many forms of property mitigate risk. Several types of leases serve
as risk-spreading devices, including residential leases,106 oil and gas leases,107
and leases on state trust lands.108 Likewise, as Henry Hansmann contends,
condominiums may have surpassed cooperatives in part because condos are a
superior device for sharing risk.109 Overall, inclusion allows certain risk-averse
parties to use, possess, and enjoy property while bearing less risk.
5. Specialization
Inclusion is also ubiquitous because of the advantages of specialization.110
A landlord manages an apartment complex on behalf of tenants; a trustee
manages funds for beneficiaries; and a CEO manages corporate assets on
behalf of shareholders. An owner’s inclusion of a nonowner may benefit both
parties because each party is able to utilize her own strengths and capabilities.
Many property forms, including leases, condos, trusts, and corporations,
entail specialization. In leasing an apartment or office, tenants “specialize in
possession and operation of discrete units within the larger complex,” while
103 See Ellickson & Thorland, supra note 90, at 369 (citing J.V. Henderson & Y.M. Ioannides, A Model of
Housing Tenure Choice, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 98 (1983)).
104 Id. at 371.
105 STEVEN N.S. CHEUNG, THE THEORY OF SHARE TENANCY 68 (1969). But cf. DOUGLAS W. ALLEN &
DEAN LUECK, THE NATURE OF THE FARM: CONTRACTS, RISK, AND ORGANIZATION IN AGRICULTURE 10 (2002)
(finding little support for risk-spreading theory).
106 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 649 (describing how leasing reduces risk for both tenants and
landlords).
107 See, e.g., Comm’r v. Engle, 464 U.S. 206, 219 n.17 (1984) (noting that “lessees can spread their risks
over many leased properties”).
108 See, e.g., JON A. SOUDER & SALLY K. FAIRFAX, STATE TRUST LANDS: HISTORY, MANAGEMENT, AND
SUSTAINABLE USE 71–77 (1996) (discussing “leasing as a mechanism for managing and apportioning risk”).
109 See Henry Hansmann, Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax
Subsidies, and Tenure Choice, 20 J. LEGAL STUD. 25, 60 (1991).
110 See YORAM BARZEL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PROPERTY RIGHTS 51 (2d ed. 1997).
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the landlord is responsible for “constructing, maintaining, insuring, and
coordinating assets common to the entire complex.”111 Likewise, condos are
popular in part because residents own their individual units and hire managers
to supervise the complex and maintain common areas.112 Trusts, by providing
managerial intermediation, exemplify the benefits of specialization:
beneficiaries enjoy distributions of income and principal, while the trustee is
responsible for managing and investing the trust corpus.113 Finally, in a
corporation, shareholders bear the benefits and burdens of ownership, while
the directors and managers operate the firm on a daily basis.114
Overall, many property forms promote specialization through inclusion.115
In discussing the benefits of divided ownership, Yoram Barzel notes how “sole
ownership may result in yet a greater loss due to reduced specialization.”116
And specialization is often advantageous for owners and nonowners alike.
***
Including others is often beneficial because different parties derive benefits
from different aspects of the property. Sharing enables donative transfers
without requiring the transfer of ownership (e.g., waiving IP rights over a lifesaving drug or creating a trust to support a surviving spouse). Exchange
facilitates mutually beneficial agreements regarding the use or possession of
property without complete alienation (e.g., licensing software). Financing
111 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 650; see also Victor P. Goldberg et al., Bargaining in the Shadow
of Eminent Domain: Valuing and Apportioning Condemnation Awards Between Landlord and Tenant, 34
UCLA L. REV. 1083, 1095 (1987) (“Leasing is economically beneficial because it permits specialization of
functions.”); Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 217 (“A lease . . . can enhance efficiency by allowing gains
from specialization.”).
112 See Jonathan D. Ross-Harrington, Note, Property Forms in Tension: Preference Inefficiency, RentSeeking, and the Problem of Notice in the Modern Condominium, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 196 (2009)
(“[C]ondominiums create efficiencies by allowing for specialization in management . . . .”).
113 See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 579 (9th ed. 2013);
MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 779.
114
See ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
4–6 (Transaction Publishers 1991) (1932); see also Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and
Economics, 53 VA. L. REV. 259, 261–65 (1967) (discussing efficiency of specialization in the corporate form).
115 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 646, 649–50, 778–79, 805–06 (explaining that leases, trusts,
corporations, and partnerships “permit the management of resources to be separated from their use and
enjoyment” and promote the “specialization of functions”).
116 BARZEL, supra note 110, at 55; see also Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 301–02 (1983) (presenting a model in which division of
ownership and control is an efficient specialization of functions); Henry E. Smith, The Language of Property:
Form, Context, and Audience, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1105, 1173 (2003) (“Divided property rights in assets can be
used to facilitate specialization in production or consumption.”).
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allows a party to obtain access to property without purchasing it (e.g., leasing
rather than buying a car). Risk-spreading allows nonowners, as well as owners,
to share risks (e.g., renting an apartment for what could be a short-term move).
Finally, specialization allows parties to maximize their joint gains by
performing distinct roles or functions (e.g., having one party manage a trust for
a fee while another party enjoys the income from the trust).
B. Social Costs of Inclusion
If contracts were complete or property rights could be perfectly specified
and enforced, inclusion would be straightforward. But ex ante specification is
difficult for several reasons.117 Because contracts are incomplete and property
rights are imperfect,118 inclusion entails a number of potential issues, including
(1) coordination difficulties, (2) strategic behavior, and (3) conflicts over use.

117

First, it is difficult to foresee all potential contingences. See Hermalin et al., supra note 83, at 75
(discussing the idea that, because of bounded rationality, individuals “fail to foresee all possible contingencies
and, thus, their contracts suffer from unforeseen contingencies”). Second, even if foreseeable, it is costly for
the parties to specify additional terms. See id. at 76–77; see also SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 299 (“[P]arties
will tend not to specify terms of low probability events . . . .”). Third, in defining the scope of inclusion, parties
may be unable to observe whether they share a common understanding of certain terms or conditions. See
Hermalin et al., supra note 83, at 78–79 (discussing asymmetric information and the problem of observability).
Fourth, even if the parties have the same understanding, either party may act opportunistically, and it is costly
for the parties to rely on courts or other enforcement mechanisms to verify compliance. See id. at 79
(discussing the problem of verifiability); see also Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract,
and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S382
(2002) (“[I]f the parties solve the coordination problem, each needs assurance that the other will not
opportunistically assert rights that properly belong to the other.”).
118 On incomplete contracts, see SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 299–301; and Hermalin et al., supra note 83,
at 75–80. See generally OLIVER HART, FIRMS, CONTRACTS, AND FINANCIAL STRUCTURE (1995) (arguing that
the existence of incomplete contracts and ex post opportunism help to explain many economic institutions and
arrangements); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of
Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 691 (1986) (“When it is costly to list all specific rights
over assets in the contract, it may be optimal to let one party purchase all residual rights. . . . [T]his inevitably
creates distortions.”); Oliver Hart & John Moore, Foundations of Incomplete Contracts, 66 REV. ECON. STUD.
115 (1999) (attempting to provide a foundation for the idea of “incomplete contracting”). On imperfect
specification and enforcement of property rights, see Sebastian Galiani & Ernesto Schargrodsky, Land
Property Rights and Resource Allocation, 54 J.L. & ECON. S329, S330 (2011) (citing BARZEL, supra note
110), noting that “creating, specifying, and enforcing property rights is costly and, hence, these rights will
never be perfect.” Cf. Henry E. Smith, An Economic Analysis of Law Versus Equity 9 (Oct. 22, 2010)
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/LEO/HSmith_LawVersusEquity7.pdf
(suggesting that “opportunism is behavior that is undesirable but that cannot be cost-effectively captured—
defined, detected, and deterred—by explicit ex ante rulemaking”).
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1. Coordination Difficulties
If a single party, A, owns property, in fee simple absolute, there is little or
no difficulty in coordinating how to use the property. A can use her property in
whatever way, and to whatever extent, she believes to be best (assuming the
use does not constitute a nuisance or violate a covenant or zoning ordinance).
If A wants to go for a swim in her pool, then A can do so. As long as she does
not schedule two events on her property at the same time, there is no
possibility of conflict.
However, suppose that A decides to divide her property by including
another party, B. Now A and B must coordinate how to use the property. For
example, B may have a limited right to use the property for a certain purpose
(as in a license or easement), with A retaining the right to use it for all other
purposes. Or B may have the right to possess the property for a limited period
of time (as in a lease or bailment), with A reserving the right to retake
possession when B’s interest ends. A division of rights also could entail A and
B using the property at the same time or in close proximity. In each situation
involving more than one party, there is a higher likelihood that disputes will
arise because of coordination difficulties. Put another way, multiple parties
may want to use the swimming pool at the same time.119
2. Strategic Behavior
Coordination problems can be exacerbated by the possibility of strategic
behavior. Including others creates a risk for many types of opportunism.120 An
owner may want to include another for one purpose, but it may be difficult for
the owner to limit access for this particular purpose. For instance, a party who
is being included may seek to expand the scope of the inclusion. Or, other
parties may attempt to expand the inclusion by using the property for the
authorized purpose. If the expected costs of inclusion become too high, owners
may decide not to include others at the outset.
119 See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 29 (“If many individuals have the right to use a person’s backyard
swimming pool at different times, the odds of different people wishing to use the pool simultaneously will
increase.”).
120 Oliver Williamson defines opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile.” OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING 47 (1985).
Williamson describes “guile” broadly to include “calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or
otherwise confuse,” as well as incomplete disclosure of information. Id.; see also Oliver E. Williamson,
Opportunistic Behaviour in Contracts, in 2 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW
703, 703 (Peter Newman ed., 1998). I use “strategic behavior” and “opportunism” interchangeably.
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Consider two examples that illustrate the problem of opportunism in the
context of inclusion. A homeowner, H, may be willing to grant a neighbor, N,
an easement over H’s land to provide N with access to a beach for swimming
and boating.121 But, once included, N may increase the intensity of use, number
of authorized uses, or scope of the easement.122 For example, N may use the
easement not only for swimming and boating but also for having a picnic.123
Similarly, a patent owner, P, may seek to license a patent to a firm, F, for a
new smartphone.124 Yet, once included, F may attempt to increase the scope of
the license.125 Anticipating strategic behavior, owners, such as H and P, may
be less willing to include nonowners, such as N and F, at the outset.
Of course, opportunism is a two-way street: owners, like nonowners, may
act strategically. For example, a patent troll owns a property interest solely for
the purpose of inclusion because the troll is only able to monetize its interest
through strategic licensing agreements. In this case, nonowners may choose to
forgo an otherwise beneficial inclusion.
Overall, opportunism is problematic for several reasons. First, fearing
strategic behavior, there is less incentive for owners to include others or for
nonowners to seek to be included and, thus, a lower likelihood of sharing or
exchange. Second, even if including others is feasible, parties often will incur
additional costs in specifying the terms of inclusion. Third, opportunism may
result in monitoring costs, especially if a nonowner is acting as an agent (e.g., a
trustee or manager) on behalf of the owner, the principal (e.g., the settlor or
shareholders).126 The possibility of strategic behavior is thus a significant cost
of inclusion and may impede certain transfers that involve including others.127

121 See, e.g., Mountainview Landowners Coop. Ass’n v. Cool, 86 P.3d 484, 486 (Idaho 2004) (describing
an easement for “use of the beach area . . . for swimming and boating only” (internal quotation mark omitted)).
122 See Lee J. Strang, Damages as the Appropriate Remedy for “Abuse” of an Easement: Moving Toward
Consistency, Efficiency, and Fairness in Property Law, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 933, 935−36 (2008).
123 See Mountainview Landowners, 86 P.3d at 488 (“Picnics and gatherings for relaxation and social
interaction would not under any stretch be swimming.”).
124 See, e.g., Dan Levine & Edwin Chan, Apple Expert Shines Light on Samsung Sales in U.S., REUTERS
(Aug. 13, 2012, 2:34 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/14/us-apple-samsung-idUSBRE87C0SC20
120814 (reporting that “an Apple executive testified that the company had licensed prized design patents to
Microsoft”).
125 See Dan Levine & Poornima Gupta, Apple, Samsung Launch Salvos as Smartphone Trial Heats Up,
REUTERS (July 31, 2012, 7:47 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/31/us-apple-samsung-trialidUSBRE86Q16X20120731 (“Apple sued Samsung in . . . federal court, accusing the South Korean company
of slavishly copying the iPhone and iPad.”).
126 A corporate manager may not have the same interests as the shareholders. See Michael C. Jensen &
William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J.
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3. Conflicts over Use
A related difficulty with inclusion is the potential for conflicts over use.
Because a nonowner may have a shorter time horizon than an owner with
respect to the property, the nonowner may discount the future utility of the
property.128 As a result, the nonowner may engage in actions—such as
imposing excessive wear-and-tear—that do not maximize the property’s value
in the long run.129 For the same reason, a nonowner’s private incentive to
maintain or improve the property may diverge from what is socially optimal.130
As a result, a nonowner may engage in actions—such as not maintaining the
property—that result in a decline in the asset’s value.
Consider the classic example of a landlord and tenant. A tenant will take
actions that affect the property’s future value.131 But the tenant does not bear
the full costs or benefits of using or maintaining the property. Consequently,
the tenant may use the property excessively or maintain the property
inadequately.132 For instance, in an agricultural lease, the owner of the land
may worry that a tenant farmer will ignore the long-term sustainability of the
field.133 In a residential lease, the landlord may fear that a tenant will ignore a
minor problem (e.g., a leaky faucet), resulting in a more serious problem in the
future (e.g., flooding).134 Likewise, a rental car company may limit the number
of miles but is usually unable to prevent excessive wear-and-tear on the brakes

FIN. ECON. 305, 308–09 (1976). A trustee may not have the same interests as the settlor. See Robert H. Sitkoff,
An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621, 621 (2004).
127 Cf. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S382−83 (stating that the potential for opportunism
may decrease the value of rights as “parties may take costly private actions to protect their rights; investments
in improving and using assets may be discouraged; privately borne risk may increase; and transactions that
would otherwise take place may not occur”).
128 See POSNER, supra note 83, at 90.
129 See id. at 90−92 (discussing divided ownership in estates in land); SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 79
(discussing externalities in the treatment of rental property).
130 See Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 217 (“The division of ownership and use . . . creates potential
incentive problems for both landlords and tenants regarding the optimal maintenance and use of the
property.”).
131 See POSNER, supra note 83, at 90–91; SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 79.
132 See Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 217.
133 See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 79 (“When a person rents farmland, he may reduce its usefulness by
abusing it, letting it erode, and so forth . . . .”); Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 218 (developing a model in
which, given a fixed rent, landlord and tenant “under invest in maintenance”).
134 Cf. Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1078 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“A tenant’s tenure in a
specific apartment will often not be sufficient to justify efforts at repairs.”); Davidow v. Inwood N. Prof’l
Grp.—Phase I, 747 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. 1988) (“[B]ecause commercial tenants often enter into short-term
leases, the tenants have limited economic incentive to make any extensive repairs to their premises.”).
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or upholstery.135 In a similar way, the interests of licensors and licensees,
settlors and trustees, and shareholders and directors may diverge as well.
Thus, although the actions of nonowners may affect the future value of the
property, nonowners may not have an incentive to internalize the full costs of
their actions. Owners can take measures to mitigate the problem.136 However,
such measures are usually imperfect and costly. As a result, owners will have
an incentive to include others less often than if the interests of the parties were
aligned. And, once again, the problem is reciprocal: there is a risk that owners,
as well as nonowners, may engage in this type of behavior.137
III. COMPETING MODES OF INCLUSION
To maximize the net benefits of inclusion, the law authorizes multiple ways
of including others, including informal, contractual, and proprietary inclusion.
Part III.A discusses informal inclusion through nonenforcement and waiver.
Part III.B analyzes inclusion via contract, compares informal and contractual
inclusion, and identifies certain limitations of contract in deterring
opportunism. Part III.C considers inclusion through well-recognized forms of
property. After examining the functional justifications for distinguishing
between these property forms and contracts, I compare several forms of
property that facilitate inclusion.
A. Informal Inclusion
Informal inclusion involves situations in which an owner includes another
in property, but the inclusion imposes no legal obligations on the parties.
Unlike formal inclusion, which relies on contract or property law, informal
inclusion relies on an owner’s discretion and social norms to govern the scope,
terms, and termination of the inclusion. This Article discusses two types of
informal inclusion: nonenforcement and waiver.

135 See POSNER, supra note 83, at 94; SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 79. The impediments to monitoring
driver behavior are sometimes legal, not economic or technological. See, e.g., Elizabeth C. Yen, Rent a Car,
Rent a Spy, BUS. L. TODAY, July/Aug. 2005, at 59, 59. On rental car agreements, see generally Irma S. Russell,
Got Wheels? Article 2A, Standardized Rental Car Terms, Rational Inaction, and Unilateral Private Ordering,
40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 137 (2006), studying the form contracts of ten rental car companies.
136 See SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 17.
137 See DUKEMINIER ET AL., supra note 63, at 482 (discussing how tenants have an incentive to “neglect
maintenance” and landlords have an incentive to “neglect everyday repairs”).
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As noted above, Robert Merges discusses how owners can include others
by not enforcing property rights.138 Merges highlights the “crucial postgrant
stage in the life of a typical property right.”139 He argues that attending to this
stage “reveals all sorts of ways that the supposedly exclusive right of property
is actually bound up with various forms of inclusion.”140 “The most obvious
example,” according to Merges, is “nonenforcement” because “rights that are
theoretically exclusive can be voluntarily left idle for all sorts of reasons—
rendering them not very exclusive at all.”141
Nonenforcement (e.g., not ejecting a trespasser or not filing a claim against
a patent or copyright infringer) is distinct from other types of inclusion. First,
nonenforcement is passive. Unlike a gratuitous license or a lease, an owner
who includes through nonenforcement does not have to take any affirmative
steps.142 Second, nonenforcement is ex post. Unlike a waiver that is given in
advance, the decision not to exclude a nonowner usually occurs, or is made
evident, after the nonowner begins to use the owner’s property.143 Third, unlike
contracts or property forms, nonenforcement does not create new rights or
duties. In other words, nonenforcement functions as an implicit waiver of the
right to exclude after the fact.
The problem with nonenforcement is that it provides little certainty. The
nonowner is able to use the property only under a continual risk of losing
access. At any time, the owner may decide to exclude.144 With a few
exceptions like estoppel, laches, and adverse possession, the law does not
provide a nonowner with any legal rights or remedies. Of course, social norms
and other factors may affect the circumstances in which the owner decides to
terminate the inclusion.145 But, ultimately, the decision not to enforce is within
the owner’s discretion. An owner may decide to exclude at any time or for any

138

See supra notes 65–68 and accompanying text.
MERGES, supra note 2, at 295.
140
Id.
141 Id.; see also Robert P. Merges, Autonomy and Independence: The Normative Face of Transaction
Costs, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 145, 161 n.22 (2011) (collecting sources regarding “empirical evidence on extensive
underenforcement of patents in biotechnology” and “extensive nonenforcement of copyrights in the online
context”).
142 See MERGES, supra note 2, at 295.
143 See id.
144 See id.
145 See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Noncompliance, Nonenforcement, Nonproblem? Rethinking the
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1059, 1095 (2008) (discussing the social norms
governing the “nonenforcement of patents”).
139
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reason, even if opportunistic.146 Moreover, a nonowner may have an incentive
to expand the scope of the inclusion and to use property excessively, especially
knowing that the owner can revoke at any time. Thus, nonenforcement may
provide little protection against strategic behavior.
Another type of informal inclusion is waiver. An owner can include a
nonowner in her property by gratuitously waiving the right to exclude.147 A
waiver of the right to exclude is a “permission slip” from the owner to a
nonowner.148 The waiver may be explicit (e.g., an invitation) or implicit (e.g., a
store opening its doors).149 Yet, unlike nonenforcement, which entails an
owner’s decision not to enforce after the fact, a waiver entails a decision to
include before the fact—essentially, a promise in advance not to exclude.
Including others through waiver is pervasive.150 A common type of waiver
is a gratuitous license.151 A gratuitous license involves a waiver of the right to
exclude, converting what would otherwise be a trespass into a lawful entry
upon or use of the owner’s property.152 Another example is the waiver of IP
rights in life-saving drugs.153 Because waiver is consistent with several of the

146 See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, Response, Individual Creators in the Cultural Commons, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 793, 804 (2010) (describing companies that withhold patent information from standard-setting
organizations of which they are a part, and stating that “the strategic use of patents here has the potential to do
real economic harm”).
147 See MERGES, supra note 2, at 295.
148 Thomas W. Merrill, The Landscape of Constitutional Property, 86 VA. L. REV. 885, 976 (2000) (“A
license is a ‘permission slip’ from someone with the right to exclude that allows another to gain access to a
resource.”).
149 See, e.g., St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So. 2d 670, 676 (Fla. 1950); see also
JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 362 (3d ed. 2002) (“Entering a
store during business hours would not be deemed a trespass because entry onto the property is based on
implied consent.”). There is also the possibility of an implied IP license. See Mark D. Janis, A Tale of the
Apocryphal Axe: Repair, Reconstruction, and the Implied License in Intellectual Property Law, 58 MD. L.
REV. 423, 514 (1999).
150 See MERGES, supra note 2, at 286–87 (“The choice to waive property rights is part and parcel of the
property system, and owners often exercise this choice so as to reduce the worst potential effects of property
rights.”); SINGER, supra note 149, at 362 (“Possessors of real property constantly grant non-owners permission
to enter their property.”).
151 See THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, THE OXFORD INTRODUCTIONS TO U.S. LAW: PROPERTY
85 (2010) (noting that “licenses are ubiquitous in everyday life”).
152 See JON W. BRUCE & JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE LAW OF EASEMENTS AND LICENSES IN LAND § 11:1
(2013) (defining a license as “the permission to do something on the land of another that, without such
authority, would be unlawful”).
153 See MERGES, supra note 2, at 286 (citing Pharmaceuticals: Quagmire to Goldmine?, ECONOMIST,
May 17, 2008, at 102) (“Most major pharmaceutical companies have undertaken voluntary free drug
distribution programs.”).
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advantages of inclusion, Merges contends that “the ability to waive property
rights is a crucial benefit.”154
The problem with waiver, even if inclusion is socially beneficial, is that it
provides little certainty to nonowners. Compared to nonenforcement, waiver
lowers the risk to a nonowner; without revoking a waiver, the owner cannot
claim a nonowner is trespassing or infringing. However, like nonenforcement,
a waiver or gratuitous license is freely revocable.155 If an owner withdraws a
waiver or license, the nonowner may have no legal remedy, unless the license
is coupled with a grant or constitutes an easement by estoppel.156 The
ambulatory nature of the interest means that, in the absence of social norms or
repeat play, a nonowner may have little incentive to rely on a waiver.
Thus, except in limited circumstances, waiver does little to reduce the
possibility of opportunism. Nonowners may attempt to increase the scope of
their rights, to utilize the property excessively, or to maintain the property
inadequately. These problems may discourage owners from granting a waiver
or license. Similarly, nonowners may hesitate to participate in informal
inclusion, given that a waiver or license is freely revocable and an owner can
revoke, or threaten to revoke, the waiver at any time. To deter opportunism, it
may be necessary to rely on more formal mechanisms of inclusion like
contracts.
B. Contractual Inclusion
While informal inclusion typically relies on the discretion of owners and
social norms, formal inclusion relies on legal rules. Specifically, two or more
parties may enter into a contract in which an owner includes another in the use,
possession, or enjoyment of property in exchange for some consideration. For
example, an owner may include a nonowner by contractually agreeing not to
enforce an exclusion right, from distressed loan workouts and foreclosure
defenses,157 to the settlement of patent and copyright disputes.158 Similarly,
154

Id.
See 25 AM. JUR. 2D Easements and Licenses § 122 (2004) (“A license ordinarily may be revoked
without notice and without cause . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
156 Generally, a gratuitous license is irrevocable only in two circumstances: (i) if a licensor combines the
license with a grant or (ii) if the license constitutes an easement by estoppel because the licensee reasonably
and substantially relies on the license and revoking the license would be unjust. See id.
157 See Richard S. Fries, Bingham McCutchen LLP, Distressed Loan Workouts and Remedies,
Presentation at the Practising Law Institute Seminar: Negotiating Real Estate Deals 2012 (June 5, 2012)
(discussing agreements to waive or not to enforce rights).
155
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there are many types of contracts, including IP licenses, in which an owner
includes another by waiving the right to exclude in advance.159
Unlike gratuitous licenses, which entail sharing, contractual licenses
involve exchange. A ticket that permits a spectator to enter a sports stadium or
movie theater is, by most accounts, a license.160 In exchange for entry into the
stadium or theater, a licensee pays the admission price⎯i.e., the cost of the
ticket. Similarly, an owner may license a patent in exchange for royalty
payments or an equity stake in a firm.161 Licensing IP rights also serves as a
mechanism for financing, risk-spreading, and specialization.162
However, unlike gratuitous licenses, which are freely revocable, the
meaning of “revocability” in contractual licenses is ambiguous.163 There is
uncertainty about whether such agreements entail a contract, a license, or a
contract and a license.164 The modern view is that nongratuitous licenses have
most, perhaps all, of the attributes of contracts.165 Yet, arguably, even modern
licenses, including IP licenses, are not identical to contracts. In analyzing
copyright, Christopher Newman contends “the concept of license . . . belongs
fundamentally to property, not contract.”166 Likewise, Merrill and Smith
suggest that it may be worthwhile to distinguish between a “license” and a
“contract for a license” because “it probably leads to confusion to start treating
licenses as if they were themselves contracts.”167 Finally, IP licenses may
158 See Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Limits to Patent Settlements, 34 RAND J. ECON. 391, 392 (2003) (“The
lion’s share of patent disputes are settled rather than litigated to a resolution in court.”).
159 See Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (2004) (noting
the “ubiquitous use of restrictive licensing agreements” in IP).
160 See BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 11:1 n.55 (collecting cases).
161 See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Response: Markets in IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2154
(2012) (“[M]ost IP licensing agreements . . . measure royalties by the number of times an IP-protected good or
process is used or the number of units that are created.”); Ash Nagdev et al., IP as Venture Capital: A Case
Study of Microsoft IP Ventures, 8 WAKE FOREST INTELL. PROP. L.J. 197, 208–09 (2008) (“Microsoft IP
Ventures seeks to capitalize on this opportunity by licensing its IP in exchange for an equity stake in a
potentially high growth start-up company.”).
162
See Nagdev et al., supra note 161, at 209.
163 While a contractual license is “revocable” in one sense, revocation may constitute a breach of contract,
resulting in a claim for damages. See BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 11:6.
164 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 151, at 86.
165 See, e.g., McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Whether express or
implied, a license is a contract ‘governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.’” (quoting Power Lift,
Inc. v. Weatherford Nipple-Up Sys., Inc., 871 F.2d 1082, 1085 (Fed. Cir. 1989))).
166 Christopher M. Newman, A License Is Not a “Contract Not to Sue”: Disentangling Property and
Contract in the Law of Copyright Licenses, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1101, 1109 (2013).
167 THOMAS W. MERRILL & HENRY E. SMITH, TEACHER’S MANUAL TO PROPERTY: PRINCIPLES AND
POLICIES 157 (2d ed. 2012).
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entail anti-opportunism devices that contracts do not, including the use of
mandatory rules and the application of doctrines like misuse.168
Compared to informal inclusion, contracts provide several benefits.
Contracts allow parties to include others with more certainty. Because both
parties know they can rely on legally enforceable remedies to vindicate their
rights, they have less concern about opportunism and conflicts over use.
Moreover, unlike informal inclusion, which is freely revocable, contractual
inclusion provides more certainty to nonowners. Thus, an owner’s promise not
to enforce the right to exclude may encourage socially beneficial reliance.169 In
addition, because an owner will have less incentive to exclude, contracts may
deter various types of strategic behavior—one of the primary objectives of
contract law.170
However, contracts are not without limitations. As an initial matter,
contracts are costly to negotiate, draft, and enforce.171 Given such costs,
informal inclusion can be superior to contractual inclusion in a number of
circumstances.
First, if the benefits of inclusion are relatively small, a contract may not be
worth the costs.172 For example, if a child needs to enter a neighbor’s yard to
retrieve a ball, the costs of a contract would exceed the benefits. Likewise, an
invitation, rather than a formal contract, usually suffices for a dinner party. In
both situations, there is little or no risk of opportunism.
Second, even if opportunism is possible, relying on nonlegal sanctions such
as social norms may be superior to drafting and enforcing a contract if the only
risk is “low-value opportunism.” In analyzing the choice between law and
norms in property disputes, Ellickson explains why the “the size of the stakes
matters.”173 If the stakes are high, channeling parties into contracts and formal
remedies may be preferable because “the exercise of informal remedies [may]

168

See Christina Bohannan, IP Misuse as Foreclosure, 96 IOWA L. REV. 475, 511 (2011).
See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Enforcing Promises: An Examination of the Basis of Contract,
89 YALE L. J. 1261, 1276–83 (1980); Shavell, supra note 79, at 419; cf. Richard A. Posner, Gratuitous
Promises in Economics and Law, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 411, 416 & n.11 (1977).
170 See POSNER, supra note 83, at 117.
171 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 246–48 (1991)
(discussing contracts as social controls and indicating that one “major drawback” of contracts is “the
transaction costs of arranging and enforcing them”).
172 See id.
173 Id. at 257.
169
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trigger a violent feud.”174 By contrast, if the stakes are low, “a grievant is less
likely to regard the relatively high administrative costs of the legal system to
be worthwhile.”175 Similarly, in analyzing the role of the law in facilitating
cooperation, Eric Posner points out that “nonlegal sanctions deter low-value
opportunism” whereas “contract law serves to deter certain kinds of high-value
opportunism.”176
Third, even with high-value opportunism, informal division can be superior
to contractual division if reputation is sufficiently important or social norms
are sufficiently robust.177 For example, the diamond trade in New York City
involves valuable merchandise and a high risk of misappropriation.178
Nevertheless, as Lisa Bernstein explains, “the industry is able to use
reputation/social bonds at a cost low enough to create a system of private law
enabling most transactions to be consummated and most contracts enforced
completely outside the legal system.”179
Overall, owners will have an incentive to include others by contract, rather
than via nonenforcement or waiver, if the net benefits of contractual inclusion
are positive and exceed the net benefits of informal inclusion. If the benefits of
inclusion are relatively small, then drafting a contract is often not worth the
costs. Even if the benefits of inclusion are significant, parties may not enter a
contract if transaction costs are substantial (the attorneys’ fees may quickly
exceed the gains from trade). Parties are likely to include others through
contract if transaction costs are not prohibitive, if there is a danger of highvalue opportunism, and if reputation or social norms are inadequate to deter
strategic behavior.
However, even if owners have the ability to include both informally and
contractually, their private incentive to include others may diverge from the
socially optimal level of inclusion. There may be too little inclusion because
contracts deter opportunism and prevent conflicts only imperfectly. For
example, because contracts rely primarily on compensatory damages (while
174

Id.
Id.
176 Posner, supra note 1, at 762; cf. Claire A. Hill, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Lawsuit: A Social
Norms Theory of Incomplete Contracts, 34 DEL. J. CORP. L. 191, 210, 212–13 (2009) (arguing that litigation in
complex contracts is limited to extreme cases of opportunism).
177 See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the
Diamond Industry, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 115, 134 (1992).
178 See id. at 120.
179 Id. at 138.
175
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disfavoring specific performance and disallowing punitive damages), contracts
may be inadequate to deter certain types of strategic behavior.180 Thus, the
usual remedies for breach may be insufficient to deter opportunism, resulting
in too little cooperation.181
C. Proprietary Inclusion
In addition to informal and contractual inclusion, the law authorizes parties
to include others through various forms of property. Proprietary inclusion, like
contractual inclusion, is typically more costly than informal inclusion.
Although more expensive than informal inclusion, contractual inclusion and
proprietary inclusion both provide more certainty and greater protection
against the possibility of opportunism. However, if owners could achieve an
optimal level of inclusion using contracts, then the forms of property would
seem to be superfluous.
As this Article explains below, these property forms continue to perform a
useful function—they are instrumental in deterring opportunism and promoting
cooperation—because parties cannot achieve the optimal level of inclusion
through contract alone. Essentially, property forms complement contracts by
providing owners with a set of standardized forms from which to choose in
deciding how to include others. Moreover, these forms not only serve as viable
alternatives to contract. In many situations, property forms also can provide
more certainty and a greater degree of protection against opportunism.
Accordingly, this Article analyzes four features of property that help to
distinguish contractual and proprietary inclusion: (a) third-party effects,
(b) mandatory rules, (c) fiduciary duties, and (d) supracompensatory remedies.
There is, of course, a substantial literature on each of these features. This
Article attempts to extend the existing analysis by focusing on how each
attribute functions as an anti-opportunism device and how these attributes can
serve as substitutes as well as complements. Ultimately, each feature serves as
a justification for maintaining both contractual and proprietary inclusion.
180 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Common-Law Economic Torts: An Economic and Legal Analysis, 48
ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 746 (2006); see also Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt,
123 HARV. L. REV. 1151, 1205 (2010) (discussing shareholder opportunism and arguing that fraudulent
transfer law “provides a powerful equitable remedy in a setting where contractual remedies often are
inadequate to deter opportunism”).
181 Cf. Posner, supra note 1, at 762 (arguing that the “traditional model of contract law is inadequate”
because rational individuals would act differently “if they could rely on the courts to deter opportunism in
contractual relationships”).
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1. Justifications
a. Third-Party Effects
Authorizing owners to include others through contracts or property forms is
defensible only if there are meaningful differences between these two types of
inclusion. Several scholars, including Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith, Henry
Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, and Robert Merges, have pointed out
important differences between contracts and property with respect to third
parties. One difference between contracts and property is that contracts are in
personam—binding the parties to the contract—whereas property rights are in
rem—binding “the world.”182 Merrill and Smith argue that the reason these
two modalities of rights exist is third-party information costs.183 Thus,
allowing inclusion by both contract and property forms might be advantageous
because, in different circumstances, each type of inclusion may reduce
information costs with respect to third parties.184
Like Merrill and Smith, Hansmann and Kraakman believe that there is a
functional difference between contracts and property.185 However, they assert
the difference is that “a property right in an asset, unlike a contract right, can
be enforced against subsequent transferees of other rights in the asset.”186 In
other words, “a property right ‘runs with the asset.’”187 Under this view, in
which limitations on property types “facilitate verification of ownership of the
rights offered for conveyance,” the law reduces verification costs “by
presuming that all property rights in a given asset are held by a single

182 See Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773,
780–89 (2001) (discussing the nature of in rem rights).
183 See id. at 790–99.
184 The argument for distinguishing contract and property based on third-party information costs rests on
assuming that adequate notice does not solve the problem, an assumption that has been the subject of debate.
Compare SHAVELL, supra note 10, at 32 n.7 (arguing that the information-cost problem can be resolved
through adequate notice and registries), and Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S374 (arguing that
limitations on property are not a matter of standardization but of notice), with Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E.
Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 43–
45 (2000) (rejecting the idea that “notice cures all” because of “third-party information costs” on other market
participants), and Henry E. Smith, Standardization in Property Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE
ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 89, at 148, 170 n.4 (contending that Hansmann and Kraakman
“overlook the more pervasive role played by information costs that arise from nonstandard formats of
information and that face more impersonal audiences such as potential violators of property rights”).
185 Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S374.
186 Id.
187 Id.
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owner.”188 This presumption of undivided ownership, according to Hansmann
and Kraakman, is “subject to [an] exception that a partitioning of property
rights across more than one owner is enforceable if there has been adequate
notice of that partitioning to persons whom it might affect.”189
To illustrate why property and contract might differ in terms of their effects
on third parties, compare the functional implications of two types of property
(easements and leases) with a type of contract (Creative Commons licenses).190
Easements and leases both run with the land and thus bind future transferees.191
By contrast, in Creative Commons licenses, license terms are not necessarily
binding on downstream users because, as Merges points out, those users are
not in privity of contract.192 As a result, the original contract between licensor
and licensee does not capture the interests of all the users. For this reason,
Merges advocates a statutory, rather than contractual, solution to this problem:
Congress should legislate a “right to include” by incorporating a robust waiver
mechanism into IP law.193 In doing so, Merges helpfully illustrates one
limitation of contract in deterring opportunism and facilitating inclusion.
b. Mandatory Rules
While contracts rely primarily on default rules that the parties may modify,
property forms often entail nonwaivable rules that restrict customizability,
from disclosure requirements to the implied warranty of habitability. One
function of these mandatory rules is to deter strategic bargaining, especially in
situations in which parties may have asymmetric information.194

188

Id.
Id.
190 See Robert P. Merges, A New Dynamism in the Public Domain, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 183, 198 (2004)
(“From a legal perspective, the Creative Commons is a copyright license. Thus the entire scheme operates by
virtue of contract.”).
191 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 983. In most easements, “the benefit of the easement is
attached to a particular parcel of land, and runs with the ownership of the benefitted land.” MERRILL & SMITH,
supra note 151, at 200–01. Similarly, if a landlord transfers an apartment, the general rule is that the new
landlord is “subject to the ongoing leasehold interest” and is bound by those provisions of the original lease
that “‘run with the land.’” MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 712.
192 See Merges, supra note 190, at 198.
193 MERGES, supra note 2, at 229 (“The problem is that these [Creative Commons] licenses are only
contracts. A better mechanism would be to build the waiver mechanism directly into copyright (and patent)
law . . . .”); see also id. at 290 (advocating “a simple and binding mechanism for waiver—allowing a
rightholder to make a binding dedication of his works to the public, and thus implementing a right to include
that is coextensive with the traditional right to exclude at the heart of IP and property generally”).
194 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 826–27.
189
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Many scholars note the role of mandatory rules in deterring opportunism.
In discussing joint custody, Saul Levmore emphasizes that “mandatory rules
reduce strategic behavior and attendant costs.”195 In analyzing the implied
warranty of habitability, Merrill and Smith suggest that the implied warranty
may be immutable because it “can plausibly be viewed as a form of protection
strategy adopted in a context where tenants remain rationally ignorant and are
vulnerable to strategic behavior by landlords.”196 In examining the corporation,
Melvin Eisenberg asserts that the “law should also provide mandatory rules
that empower the courts to override bargains concerning structural and
distributional terms when necessary to prevent opportunism.”197
Of course, mandatory rules also may prevent two parties from achieving a
mutually beneficial exchange. Plus, there is a possibility that mandatory rules
sometimes may increase opportunism.198 Thus, in any context, there is room to
debate whether a nonwaivable rule is beneficial. But, theoretically, a rule that
is mandatory may deter opportunism by preventing certain types of strategic
bargaining.
c. Fiduciary Duties
As is well recognized, fiduciary duties are useful in reducing agency
costs.199 Fiduciary law applies in many situations that entail a principal–agent
relationship, including settlors and trustees and shareholders and managers.200
If an agent’s incentives diverge from the principal’s objectives, the relationship
entails agency costs.201 Agency costs include the costs associated with shirking
as well as any costs that a principal may incur in attempting to monitor the
agent to prevent shirking.202

195

Saul Levmore, Joint Custody and Strategic Behavior, 73 IND. L.J. 429, 433 (1998).
Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 833.
197 Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1466 (1989).
198 See, e.g., Jonathan R. Macey, Corporate Law and Corporate Governance: A Contractual Perspective,
18 J. CORP. L. 185, 197 (1993); cf. Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553, 554–55 (2001)
(“[U]sing mandatory rules to increase trust, in any form, may have precisely the opposite effect.”).
199 See Robert H. Sitkoff, The Economic Structure of Fiduciary Law, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1039, 1042 (2011).
200 See Robert Cooter & Bradley J. Freedman, The Fiduciary Relationship: Its Economic Character and
Legal Consequences, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (1991).
201 See Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1040, 1042; see also supra note 126 and accompanying text.
202 See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 126, at 309; see also JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & DAVID
MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL–AGENT MODEL 215 (2002).
196
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The purpose of fiduciary duties, including the duties of loyalty and care, is
to reduce agency costs by providing an ex post check on opportunism.203
Because the agent has fiduciary obligations to the principal, the agent may be
liable if the agent violates one of the duties.204 Aware of this potential liability,
the agent may have less incentive to act opportunistically.205 In discussing the
role of fiduciary duties in corporate law, Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel
point out that the fiduciary principle “replaces prior supervision with
deterrence” and that the “contours of the fiduciary principle reflect the
difficulty that contracting parties have in anticipating when and how their
interests may diverge.”206 Similarly, in exploring agency costs in trust law,
Robert Sitkoff explains how “the fiduciary obligation has eclipsed limited
powers as the chief device for controlling managerial agency costs.”207
Moreover, the substance of fiduciary duties varies by context: fiduciary
duties in corporate law are different from such duties in trust law.208 Therefore,
in various contexts, fiduciary duties can play an important role in reducing
agency costs and encouraging inclusion.209 Economists have long emphasized
the role of different organizational forms in controlling agency costs.210
d. Supracompensatory Remedies
Property forms also differ from contracts in terms of their remedies. Unlike
contracts, which typically rely on compensatory damages, many property
forms entail supracompensatory remedies, including specific performance and

203 See Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1049 (“Agency theory, and in particular its emphasis on the problem of
opportunism in circumstances of asymmetric information, explains these basic contours of fiduciary
doctrine.”).
204 See id. at 1043.
205 See D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1399, 1404
(2002) (“[F]iduciary law can be justified on the grounds that it deters opportunistic behavior.”).
206 Frank H. Easterbook & Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 702
(1982) (emphasis added).
207 Sitkoff, supra note 126, at 683.
208 See A. Joseph Warburton, Trusts Versus Corporations: An Empirical Analysis of Competing
Organizational Forms, 36 J. CORP. L. 183, 186–87 (2010); see also Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1045 (“[T]he
precise contours of the fiduciary obligation vary across the fiduciary fields.”).
209 Fiduciary duties are sometimes characterized as default rules, as the parties may customize the scope
of the duties⎯e.g., exempting certain conflicted transactions from a duty of loyalty. See generally Tamar
Frankel, Fiduciary Duties as Default Rules, 74 OR. L. REV. 1209, 1211–12 (1995) (“In my opinion, most
fiduciary rules constitute default rules.”). Typically, however, parties cannot eliminate the fiduciary
obligations entirely. See Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1046 (discussing the “mandatory core” of fiduciary duties).
210 See, e.g., Fama & Jensen, supra note 116, at 323.
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injunctions, punitive damages, and restitution.211 Often, these remedies can
play a role in deterring opportunism as well.212
First, consider specific performance and other forms of injunctive relief.
For several reasons, including a concern about deterring efficient breach,213
contract law generally disfavors the remedy of specific performance.214 By
contrast, many property forms rely on specific performance more often.215
There is some empirical evidence that requiring performance ex post may deter
opportunism ex ante.216 More generally, one function of equity and equitable
remedies, including injunctive relief, is to deter strategic behavior.217
Second, consider punitive damages. In the American legal system,
“[p]unitive damages are not recoverable for a breach of contract.”218 However,
there is a possibility of punitive damages or treble damages for many forms of
property, including easements,219 leases,220 and trusts.221 In many situations,

211

See PEÑALVER & KATYAL, supra note 44, at 16; Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 381.
Cf. Walter Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Possible
Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1970 n.27 (1996) (“[H]ard-to-detect opportunism
must be subject to quite severe sanctions if it is to be effectively deterred.”).
213 See Steven Shavell, The Design of Contracts and Remedies for Breach, 99 Q.J. ECON. 121, 146–47
(1984) (arguing that specific performance “may be an undesirable remedy from the point of view of the
creation of incentives to perform”); see also Steven Shavell, Damage Measures for Breach of Contract, 11
BELL J. ECON. 466, 466, 468 (1980) (emphasizing the desirability of moderate damages and the role of
damages as substitute for complete contracts).
214 See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Emergence of Dynamic Contract Law, 2 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L.
1, 20 (2001).
215 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 19, at 381.
216 See, e.g., Yair Listokin, The Empirical Case for Specific Performance: Evidence from the IBP–Tyson
Litigation, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 469, 470 (2005); see also Subha Narasimhan, Modification: The SelfHelp Specific Performance Remedy, 97 YALE L.J. 61, 84 (1987) (“In contracts involving non-fungible goods
or services, the only way to deter promisor opportunism is to strictly enforce the specific performance
remedy.”).
217
See Smith, supra note 118 (manuscript at 3) (arguing that “equity in private law . . . is a coherent
package of features motivated largely by one overriding goal: preventing opportunism”).
218 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (1981).
219 See, e.g., Apel v. Katz, 697 N.E.2d 600, 601, 608–09 (Ohio 1998).
220 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 186, § 15F (2013) (providing for treble damages “[i]f a tenant is
removed from the premises or excluded therefrom by the landlord or his agent except pursuant to a valid court
order”); Polk v. Sexton, 613 So. 2d 841, 845 (Miss. 1993) (upholding a punitive damages award for the breach
of a commercial lease).
221 See, e.g., Miner v. Int’l Typographical Union Negotiated Pension Plan, 601 F. Supp. 1390, 1393 (D.
Colo. 1985) (citing Rivero v. Thomas, 194 P.2d 533 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1948)) (“Exemplary damages are
available in the common law of trusts not to secure performance but to deter conduct harmful to the trusts.”).
212
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the rationale for these types of supracompensatory damages is a concern about
opportunism or bad faith,222 including an ability to avoid detection.223
Third, consider the remedy of restitution.224 In contract law, a court usually
calculates damages based on a party’s expectation interests, with reliance and
restitution being described as “alternative” measures.225 Yet, as Andrew Kull
explains, restitution can protect against certain types of opportunistic behavior
in contractual enforcement.226 Recently, the Restatement (Third) of Restitution
& Unjust Enrichment, for which Kull served as the reporter, extended the
remedy of disgorgement of profits to opportunistic breaches.227 By contrast,
unlike its relatively limited role in contract (at least historically), restitution has
played, and continues to play, a significant role in several property forms,
including trust and fiduciary law.228
2. Applications
As noted above, proprietary inclusion entails a number of forms. Each of
these forms relies on a unique mixture of anti-opportunism devices, including
mandatory rules, fiduciary duties, and supracompensatory remedies. In this
section, I examine several well-recognized property forms, including
(a) easements, (b) leases, (c) bailments, (d) condos and co-ops, and (e) trusts;

222 See David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal Sanctions, 78
CALIF. L. REV. 1, 1 (1990).
223 See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 869, 874 (1998) (“[P]unitive damages ordinarily should be awarded if . . . an injurer has a chance of
escaping liability . . . .” (italics removed)).
224 On restitution, see generally HANOCH DAGAN, THE LAW AND ETHICS OF RESTITUTION (2004); Mark P.
Gergen, What Renders Enrichment Unjust?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1927 (2001); Andrew Kull, Rationalizing
Restitution, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1191 (1995); and Saul Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65
(1985).
225 See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145,
1148–49 (1970); see also Samuel Williston, Repudiation of Contracts, 14 HARV. L. REV. 317, 318 (1901)
(discussing the “right to restitution as an alternative remedy instead of compensation in damages”).
226 See Andrew Kull, Restitution As a Remedy for Breach of Contract, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1517
(1994) (noting that rescission affords “protection against those forms of opportunism that exploit
undercompensatory enforcement”).
227 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION & UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 39 (2011); see also Caprice L.
Roberts, The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1027, 1046 (2011)
(describing “the disgorgement of profits remedy for opportunistic breach of contract”).
228 See Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1049 (noting that the “availability of a disgorgement
remedy . . . reflects the additional deterrent and disclosure purposes of fiduciary law”); Smith, supra note 205,
at 1496 (noting that the “deterrent effect of restitution mitigates the temptation for a fiduciary to act
opportunistically”).
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compare these forms both to each other and to other types of inclusion; and
explore how each form deters opportunism.
a. Easements
In the United States, “[v]ast numbers of easements encumber land title
records.”229 An easement is a “nonpossessory right to enter and use land in the
possession of another and obligates the possessor not to interfere with the uses
authorized by the easement.”230 Because owners may grant easements
“gratuitously or as part of a more general exchange of property rights,”231
easements can facilitate sharing or exchange.
Easements differ from other types of inclusion that enable sharing.
Compared to nonenforcement or waiver, easements offer greater certainty and
permanence.232 An owner that includes others via nonenforcement or waiver
can still decide to exclude at any time.233 By contrast, the owner of land that is
subject to an easement cannot exclude the owner of an estate that has an
easement to use the land.234
Distinguishing easements and licenses is difficult.235 The difficulty is that
both forms divide property according to a particular use, not possession. The
“fundamental difference” between easements and revocable licenses is that,
with revocable licenses, owners may “revoke consent at any time and thereby
terminate the license[s],” while “easements are irrevocable interests in land of
potentially perpetual duration.”236 Thus, compared to revocable licenses,
easements provide more certainty. But the challenge is in distinguishing
easements from irrevocable licenses.237 Courts usually characterize easements
229

Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist. v. Godwin Cal. Living Trust, 32 F.3d 1364, 1369 (9th Cir. 1994).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2(1) (2000).
231 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 151, at 202.
232 Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 7.1 (2000) (stating that easements are
terminable by agreement between the landowner and the benefited party), with RESTATEMENT OF PROP.
§ 519(1) & cmt. a (1944) (stating that licenses are terminable by the landowner’s will).
233 See RESTATEMENT OF PROP. § 519(1) & cmt. a (1944).
234 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2(1) (2000) (“An easement . . . obligates the
possessor not to interfere with the uses authorized by the easement.”).
235 See, e.g., Closson Lumber Co. v. Wiseman, 507 N.E.2d 974, 976 (Ind. 1987); see also Wesley
Newcomb Hohfeld, Faulty Analysis in Easement and License Cases, 27 YALE L.J. 66, 66 (1917) (noting “[t]he
unusual chaos of conceptions and inadequacy of reasoning in easement and license cases”).
236 BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 1.4.
237 See 3 MILTON R. FRIEDMAN & PATRICK A. RANDOLPH, JR., FRIEDMAN ON LEASES § 37.1.2 (Patrick A.
Randolph ed., 5th rev. ed. 2013) (“[T]he distinction between a license, particularly an irrevocable license, and
an easement, is endlessly elusive . . . .”).
230
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as “real property” as opposed to “mere licenses.”238 Yet the authority for the in
rem nature of easements is “relatively thin.”239 Moreover, contractual licenses
are arguably more like property than many courts have assumed.240
Easements also differ from several types of inclusion that enable exchange.
Unlike leases, easements are “nonpossessory” because they authorize only
“limited uses” on the burdened property.241 Because they involve limited uses,
the financing and risk-sharing functions that are pertinent for leases are not
relevant for easements. Instead, easements serve a role similar to agreements
between parties (often, neighbors) regarding the use of property. The modern
trend is to view most easements as contracts,242 but easements retain several
noncontractarian features. For example, unlike contracts, easements allow the
original parties to bind future owners; that is, both the benefit and burden of an
easement typically run with the land.243
Easement law also has developed doctrines to combat opportunism, from
disfavoring the variation of easements to issuing injunctions for abuse. Courts
are reluctant to vary a party’s obligations under an easement.244 Antony Dnes
and Dean Lueck suggest that the rationale for this reluctance is that “variation
could be claimed opportunistically as a means of altering the easement,
possibly resulting in costly adjudication.”245 In addition, an easement holder
may “abuse” an easement by exceeding the scope of the easement.246 While
Lee Strang advocates damages, rather than injunctions, as the proper remedy

238 See, e.g., Borek Cranberry Marsh, Inc. v. Jackson Co., 2010 WI 95, ¶ 15, 328 Wis. 2d 613, 785
N.W.2d 615; Simmons v. Abbondandolo, 585 N.Y.S.2d 535, 536 (App. Div. 1992).
239 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 151, at 202.
240 See Newman, supra note 166, at 1103, 1109; see also supra notes 164–68 and accompanying text.
241 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.2 cmt. d (2000); cf. Wagner v. Doehring, 553
A.2d 684, 687 (Md. 1989) (“The nonpossessory character of an easement distinguishes the interest from
possessory interests . . . .”).
242
See Abington Ltd. P’ship v. Heublein, 717 A.2d 1232, 1240 (Conn. 1998) (“[T]he recently approved
provisions of the Restatement (Third) of the Law of Property (Servitudes) . . . . adopt a contracts oriented view
of the law of easements and servitudes.”); cf. Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes:
Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1305 (1982) (stating that “[c]urrent easement law
needs little modification” to recognize a servitude as an interest in land that can be created by contract).
243 See Carol M. Rose, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors French and
Reichman, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1403 (1982); see also supra note 191 and accompanying text.
244 See Antony Dnes & Dean Lueck, Asymmetric Information and the Law of Servitudes Governing Land,
38 J. LEGAL STUD. 89, 109–10 (2009).
245 Id. at 105 tbl.1.
246 See BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 8:17; see also supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text.
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for this type of abuse,247 the traditional remedy of injunctive relief248 may help
to reduce the likelihood of strategic behavior.
b. Leases
Leasing is one of the most common ways by which owners include others
in their property.249 In 2010, out of nearly 112 million occupied housing units
in the United States, over 37 million units were rentals.250 Many businesses,
including most law firms, lease commercial real estate.251 And almost half of
the nearly 3 million owners of farms rent their farmland to others.252 Leasing is
also a common way of acquiring personal property such as airplanes and
automobiles,253 as well as commercial and industrial equipment.254
Leases facilitate exchange without requiring the outright transfer of
property.255 A lessor transfers possession of the apartment, office space, farm,
or car to a lessee. In return, the lessee makes a (rental) payment to the lessor.
As discussed above, leases also have served as a financing device from
preindustrial times to the present.256 They help to spread risk by providing
tenants with more flexibility than ownership would provide.257 And leases
entail specialization: a landlord and tenant both benefit by performing different
functions in managing and using a complex asset.258
However, leases differ from other forms of inclusion, including licenses
and easements. While a license concerns use, a lease concerns possession,

247

See Strang, supra note 122, at 937.
See id. (“[C]ourts will, under the American rule, enjoin misuse of an easement.”).
249 See Ellickson, supra note 16, at 1372 (“The scores of millions of leaseholds in the United States
demonstrate the ubiquity of these opportunities for mutual gain.”); Thomas J. Miceli et al., The Property–
Contract Boundary: An Economic Analysis of Leases, 3 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 165, 165 (2001)
(“[L]easing . . . is a common economic arrangement.”).
250 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2012, at 615 tbl.982 (2011),
available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/2012/tables/12s0982.pdf.
251 See Ed Poll, Farewell, Firm Overhead, LEGAL MGMT., Apr./May 2012, at 58, 60.
252 See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, SB/93-10, WHO OWNS AMERICA’S
FARMLAND? (1993), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/1/statbrief/sb93_10.pdf.
253 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 650.
254 See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, supra note 250, at 756 tbl.1227.
255 See Miceli et al., supra note 249, at 183 (“In many economic settings, leasing an asset is preferred to
owning it.”).
256 See supra Part II.A.3.
257 See supra Part II.A.4.
258 See supra Part II.A.5.
248
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which allows a nonowner to engage in multiple uses of the property.259 In
addition, compared to the rules governing licenses, lease law entails more
mandatory rules, including the implied warranty of habitability in residential
leases.260
Distinguishing leases and easements is straightforward, in theory.261 The
distinction turns on whether an interest is for “exclusive possession,” in which
case it is a lease, or a “nonpossessory right to use,” in which case it is an
easement.262 But, if the terms of a lease narrow a possessory interest and the
terms of an easement involve relatively broad use rights, the distinction begins
to disappear.263
Finally, since the landlord–tenant revolution,264 many courts assume leases
are contracts.265 However, although residential leases are similar to contracts,
including in their remedies for breach, leases differ in several ways. First, once
in possession, a tenant, unlike a party to a contract, has an in rem right against
the world.266 Second, at least for residential leases, lease law relies on
mandatory rules, such as the implied warranty of habitability, more often than
contract law.267 Third, like the benefit and burden of an easement, the terms of
a lease often run with the land.268 This feature of property can produce
outcomes, like the inability of a new landlord to evict an existing tenant, that
differ from the result if leases were simply contracts.269
Many of the rules governing leases target opportunism. Historically,
agricultural leases provided a way to minimize the risk of a landlord’s
expropriating the land and inputs.270 By contrast, modern residential leases
259

See FRIEDMAN & RANDOLPH, supra note 237, § 37.1.1.
See 1 id. § 10:1.2 (noting that the “implied warranty of habitability . . . . confronts all residential
landlords”).
261 BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 1:20.
262 Id.
263 See FRIEDMAN & RANDOLPH, supra note 237, § 37.1.2.
264
See Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of American Landlord–Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503,
503 (1982) (“It is generally acknowledged that the 1960’s and 1970’s saw a revolution of sorts in American
landlord–tenant law.”); Edward H. Rabin, The Revolution in Residential Landlord–Tenant Law: Causes and
Consequences, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 517, 517 (1984).
265 See, e.g., Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
266 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 822.
267 See id. at 826–28.
268 Id. at 827–28.
269 See id.
270 See Miceli et al., supra note 249, at 177 (“[T]he conveyance gives the tenant a greater incentive to
invest by protecting him from the risk of appropriation . . . .”).
260
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involve active management, maintenance, and governance problems in which
landlords can exploit asymmetric information.271 As a result, the law attempts
to deter landlord opportunism by providing each tenant with an implied
warranty of habitability.272 There is a considerable literature on whether this
warranty should be a mandatory or default rule.273 However, if the purpose of
the rule is to deter landlord opportunism, there is a case for the rule being
nonwaivable. A mandatory rule may protect tenants who lack the financial
resources to hire an attorney to review the lease or a professional to inspect the
property.274 Because of asymmetric information, such tenants may be
particularly “vulnerable to strategic behavior.”275
Understanding the lease as an anti-opportunism device helps to explain
divergences among the different types of leases. Unlike residential leases, most
commercial leases are not subject to a warranty of fitness for intended
purpose.276 Moreover, while most states impose a duty to mitigate damages on
a landlord if a tenant vacates a dwelling,277 there is in most states no analogous
duty to mitigate if a tenant vacates a commercial property.278 These differences
may be justifiable if the risk of opportunism is lower in the context of
commercial leases. In general, commercial tenants may have more
sophistication, greater legal representation, and higher financial stakes than
residential tenants.279 Courts recognize an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing in commercial leases, and this covenant may serve as a check on

271

MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 651; Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 827.
See Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 218–19 (describing how the law “provide[s] tenants with an
enforcement mechanism by transforming the lease into a contract with an implied warranty of habitability”).
273 See, e.g., David A. Super, The Rise and Fall of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, 99 CALIF. L.
REV. 389, 424–25 (2011) (examining the negative effects of a default rule on tenants and collecting citations).
274 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 827.
275 Id. at 833; see also supra Part III.C.1.b (discussing mandatory rules).
276 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 695 (citing Barton Enters. v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368 (Utah 1996))
(“To date, only a small minority of states have adopted an implied warranty of fitness in commercial cases.”).
For a survey, see Anthony J. Vlatas, Note, An Economic Analysis of Implied Warranties of Fitness in
Commercial Leases, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 658, 659 n.5 (1994).
277 See, e.g., Austin Hill Country Realty, Inc., v. Palisades Plaza, Inc., 948 S.W.2d 293, 296–97 (Tex.
1997) (adopting a duty to mitigate and noting that forty-two states and D.C. have adopted this duty in
residential leases); see also Sommer v. Kridel, 378 A.2d 767, 770–71 (N.J. 1977).
278 See Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 220 n.95 (“[T]he duty to mitigate has not been universally
applied to commercial leases.”).
279 See Daniel B. Bogart, Good Faith and Fair Dealing in Commercial Leasing: The Right Doctrine in the
Wrong Transaction, 41 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 275, 277–78, 300–01 (2008) (discussing ways in which
commercial leases differ from residential leases).
272
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opportunism.280 But, overall, the risk of opportunism based on informational
asymmetries is arguably lower in the commercial context.
Conversely, tenants may impose costs on landlords by excessively utilizing
or inadequately maintaining rental property.281 The common law addressed this
concern through the doctrine of waste,282 which still applies, although now
landlords usually specify what tenants may or may not do in the terms of a
lease.283 As Lueck and Miceli suggest, the implied warranty of habitability and
the doctrine of waste may “work in combination to create efficient bilateral
incentives for maintenance in the presence of the rental externality.”284
c. Bailments
The bailment “continues to be a pervasive transaction in modern life.”285 A
bailment is a legal form in which an owner transfers possession of personal
property to a nonowner who maintains temporary custody of the property for a
limited purpose.286 A bailment can serve many functions, including sharing,
exchange, and specialization. A gratuitous bailment entails the sharing of
property by a bailor or the free provision of custodial services by the bailee.287
By contrast, a bailment for hire, in which the bailor and bailee both benefit,288
facilitates exchange. Bailments also involve specialization. For example, dry
cleaners and jewelers perform specialized services, and valet parking and coat
checks are specialized ways of parking cars and hanging coats.

280

See id. at 280.
See John A. Lovett, Doctrines of Waste in a Landscape of Waste, 72 MO. L. REV. 1209, 1211 (2007);
Vlatas, supra note 276, at 690–91.
282 See Jedediah Purdy, The American Transformation of Waste Doctrine: A Pluralist Interpretation, 91
CORNELL L. REV. 653, 675–77 (2006); Stake, supra note 69, at 38.
283 See Lovett, supra note 281, at 1219–20 (“[P]arties frequently negate common law or statutory default
rules on waste by adopting their own contractual terms.”).
284
Lueck & Miceli, supra note 14, at 219.
285 R.H. Helmholz, Bailment Theories and the Liability of Bailees: The Elusive Uniform Standard of
Reasonable Care, 41 U. KAN. L. REV. 97, 100 (1992).
286 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 464 (“[E]xamples of bailments include the transfer of clothing
to a dry cleaning shop for cleaning, the transfer of securities to a broker for safekeeping, or the transfer of an
automobile to a valet for parking.”).
287 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 812 n.118 (“Gratuitous bailments are those voluntary
bailments in which the bailee receives no explicit or implicit consideration, current or prospective.”).
288 See JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS § 23, at 27 (James Schouler ed., 9th
ed. 1878) (setting out a tripartite framework for a bailee’s duty of care based on whether the bailment is for the
sole benefit of bailee, the sole benefit of bailor, or beneficial for both).
281
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Bailments differ from both licenses and leases. While bailees typically
enjoy the right to exclude third parties, licensees generally do not.289 In
addition, while bailees usually obtain possession of bailed property for a
specific purpose,290 tenants may use leased property for any lawful purpose not
prohibited in the lease.291 Moreover, unlike leases, bailments only apply to
personal property, and often (but not always) involve smaller stakes.292
While bailment law has a “strong contractual element,”293 bailments and
contracts are distinct.294 First, once a bailor transfers possession to the bailee,
the bailee steps into the bailor’s shoes and has a right to exclude third parties
from the property.295 Second, after transferring property to a bailee, the bailor
retains most of the rights associated with ownership, including the right to
exclude, transfer, or devise.296 Third, unlike contracts, bailments entail several
mandatory rules that impose strict liability.297 A bailee might convert goods for
personal use, deviate from the bailment’s terms and use the property for other
purposes, or misdeliver goods by returning them to a wrong party.298 Yet, in
each situation—conversion, contractual deviation, and misdelivery of goods—
the law imposes an immutable rule of strict liability.299
Imposing strict liability via these mandatory rules may deter opportunism.
For example, mandatory strict liability for conversion may be desirable
because the bailee is violating a bailor’s rights by using the property for the
bailee’s own purposes.300 Permitting the parties to opt out of this rule might
open the door for opportunism, and the benefits of allowing a nonnegligent use

289

See BRUCE & ELY, JR., supra note 152, § 11:5; MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 464.
Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 812.
291 See id. at 822.
292 See id. at 811.
293 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 464.
294 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 811–20 (investigating in personam, intermediate, and in rem
relations in bailment law); see also William V. Vetter, The Parking Lot Cases Revisited: Confusion at or
About the Gate, 40 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 27, 31 (1999) (“Bailment rules, as applied, seem more consistent
with property, agency, or trust law than with contract law.”). For an earlier statement suggesting that, in
practice, bailments and contracts diverge, see William King Laidlaw, Principles of Bailment, 16 CORNELL
L.Q. 286, 287 (1931) (“Although it is frequently said that bailment is founded upon contract, the actual
decisions show that it is not so founded.”).
295 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 464.
296 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 812.
297 See id. at 816–19.
298 See id.
299 See id.
300 Id. at 817–18.
290
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of the bailor’s property are negligible.301 Moreover, strict liability for
contractual deviation may deter bailees from presenting themselves as the
ostensible owners of the property.302 Again, there seems to be little cost in
discouraging this type of strategic behavior. Finally, opportunism may help to
explain a puzzle about misdelivery: namely, why the law employs a negligence
standard for bailed property that is lost, stolen, or destroyed but strict liability
for goods that a bailee misdelivers.303 Strict liability for misdelivery may deter
certain types of opportunism in which the bailee could collude with a third
party.304 By contrast, deterring opportunism may be less of a concern for goods
that are lost, stolen, or destroyed if the bailee cannot benefit.305 Thus, strict
liability for misdelivery, as well as conversion and contractual deviation, may
serve an anti-opportunism function.
d. Condos and Co-ops
The use of common-interest communities (CICs), including condominiums
(condos) and cooperatives (co-ops), has grown exponentially.306 With condos
and co-ops, residents purchase individual units and pay an association fee to
maintain common areas and amenities.307 By purchasing individual units,
residents obtain some of the benefits of homeownership, e.g., residents may
prefer living in CICs to leasing apartments if they value having control over
decisions like remodeling the kitchen.308 At the same time, CICs also achieve

301

See id. at 819.
Id. at 818.
303 See, e.g., Helmholz, supra note 285, at 99 (concluding that “[i]t is hard to see any good reason” for this
distinction).
304 Merrill and Smith hint at this type of collusion by noting that “misdelivery confers a benefit on a third
party” and, as a result, “the bailee may be tempted to connive with a third party to ‘misdeliver’ the property,
and it will be difficult for the bailor to prove that this has happened.” MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 151, at
480 (quoting Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 815) (internal quotation mark omitted).
305 A bailee’s conniving with a third party to “steal” goods is less likely because, unlike a bona fide
purchaser who can acquire title if he receives misdelivered goods from a bailee in the ordinary course of
business, a third party could not acquire title for goods that are “stolen” because the third party would not be a
buyer in the ordinary course of business. See U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (2012).
306 See Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of
Housing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 278–80 (2007); see also Hansmann, supra note 109, at 25
(discussing how condos and co-ops “have spread rapidly through the real estate market”).
307 See Hansmann, supra note 109, at 26.
308 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 750.
302
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economies of scale regarding maintenance and certain amenities, like a pool or
tennis courts, that residents may not otherwise have been able to afford.309
Compared to leases, CICs mitigate the costs of inclusion. Because residents
own their units, condos avoid excessive utilization or inadequate maintenance,
except in common areas of the building.310 But, unlike leases, CICs introduce
the risk of opportunism by an association or governing board.311 Moreover, as
Lior Strahilevitz notes, some amenities can function as exclusionary devices,
suggesting that CICs also may involve a danger of discrimination.312
The main differences between condos and co-ops involve financing and
approving residents. With respect to financing, condos may have a financing
advantage because the collective mortgage in a co-op means that each owner
“bears a portion of the risk that one of his or her fellow share owners will
default.”313 However, the collective mortgage in a co-op does make it easier
for co-ops to utilize tax-deductible debt for improvements, impose liens on
defaulting owners, and evict owners for transgressing rules.314 In approving
residents, co-ops may reduce demand by requiring the disclosure of financial
records, imposing limitations on shareholder debt, and prohibiting
subletting.315 On the other hand, these strict financing and approval
requirements may reduce the risk for other shareholders.316 Plus, some owners
may desire the type of exclusivity that certain co-ops provide, though attempts
by co-ops “to maintain a community with certain desired characteristics” can
increase the risk of discrimination.317

309 See Lee Anne Fennell, Contracting Communities, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 829, 841–42; Mark D. West &
Emily M. Morris, The Tragedy of the Condominiums: Legal Responses to Collective Action Problems After the
Kobe Earthquake, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 903, 927 (2003).
310 See Hannah J. Wiseman, Rethinking the Renter/Owner Divide in Private Governance, 2012 UTAH L.
REV. 2067, 2075 (arguing that, for both condo owners and apartment tenants, “a third party typically provides
most building maintenance—thus creating different incentives for upkeep by unit tenants”).
311 See Yoram Barzel & Tim R. Sass, The Allocation of Resources by Voting, 105 Q.J. ECON. 745, 770
(1990); see also West & Morris, supra note 309, at 927 (discussing how strategic behavior is a “source of
collective-action costs” for condo owners).
312 See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Communities, 92 VA. L. REV. 437,
449 (2006) (exploring whether “residential golf communities have functioned as exclusionary club goods”).
313 Schill et al., supra note 306, at 283; see also Allen C. Goodman & John L. Goodman, Jr., The Co-op
Discount, 14 J. REAL ESTATE FIN. & ECON. 223, 225 (1997).
314 See Schill et al., supra note 306, at 283.
315 Id. at 283–84.
316 See id. at 284.
317 Id.; cf. Strahilevitz, supra note 312, at 452 (discussing how residents in Manhattan cooperatives may
want to exclude certain applicants).
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The laws governing CICs entail rules aimed at mitigating opportunism. A
key feature distinguishing condos from co-ownership is that the owners of
condos generally do not possess the right of partition.318 This eliminates the
risk of strategic exit.319 Jurisdictions differ on whether condo developers are
subject to fiduciary duties,320 but condo directors are normally subject to such
duties.321 In addition, in many jurisdictions, the covenants in the master deed,
as well as subsequent actions by the association or board, are subject to a
“reasonableness” requirement.322 Finally, other anti-opportunism doctrines,
including the implied warranty of habitability, apply to co-ops (technically, coop shareholders are “lessees”),323 but generally do not apply to condos.324
Should an anti-opportunism device like the implied warranty of habitability
extend to CICs? Existing law appears to turn on a formalistic distinction: co-op
shareholders, as lessees, enjoy an implied warranty; condo owners, who are not
lessees, do not.325 But, functionally, the owners of co-ops and condos are
similarly situated. Unlike residential tenants, the owners of co-ops and condos
tend to have a significant financial stake in the property.326 Plus, a purchaser of
a co-op or condo may be more likely than a residential tenant to obtain an
inspection of the unit,327 especially if a lender requires it.328 Thus, there may be

318

See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A. Heller, The Liberal Commons, 110 YALE L.J. 549, 616 n.258 (2001).
See id.
320 See 31 C.J.S. Estates § 261 (2008 & Supp. 2013).
321 See, e.g., VINCENT DI LORENZO, NEW YORK CONDOMINIUM AND COOPERATIVE LAW § 12:2 (rev. 2d
ed. Supp. 2013).
322 See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1278 (Cal. 1994) (citing CAL. CIV.
CODE § 1354 (current version at CAL. CIV. CODE § 5975 (2014))).
323 See Christopher S. Brennan, Note, The Next Step in the Evolution of the Implied Warranty of
Habitability: Applying the Warranty to Condominiums, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3042 (1999).
324 See id. at 3041.
325 See id. at 3041–42.
326 See Hansmann, supra note 109, at 26.
327 See, e.g., Alisa M. Levin, Condo Developers and Fiduciary Duties: An Unlikely Pairing?, 24 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 197, 204–05 (2011) (discussing how condominium form contracts typically provide an
inspection period at or near the time of contracting, at or near the time of closing, or both).
328 Cf. Craig R. Thorstenson, Note, Mortgage Lender Liability to the Purchasers of New or Existing
Homes, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 191, 202 (“Construction loans usually contain a provision allowing the mortgage
lender to inspect the house as its construction progresses.”). But cf. Hansmann, supra note 109, at 38 (“No
individual purchaser [of a condo or co-op] has an incentive to bear on his own the full cost of inspecting the
common features of the building . . . . In contrast . . . the purchaser of a single-family house, receives the full
benefit of an inspection and, therefore, has an appropriate incentive to undertake it.”); Debra Pogrund Stark &
Andrew Cook, Pay It Forward: A Proactive Model to Resolving Construction Defects and Market Failure, 38
VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 4 n.7 (2003) (“With a condominium purchase, the purchaser rarely inspects the common
elements of the building, especially if there are a large number of units for the building. But, pursuant to state
319
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less need for an implied warranty of habitability to prevent opportunism, and
no reason for treating co-ops and condos differently in this regard.
e. Trusts
The three main types of trusts—donative, charitable, and business—each
facilitate inclusion. Donative and charitable trusts promote sharing, as owners
gratuitously transfer property to trustees for the benefit of ascertainable
beneficiaries329 or charitable purposes.330 These trusts facilitate specialization
as well because they rely on “managerial intermediation”: the beneficiaries
receive distributions of income and principal from the trust, while a trustee
specializes in managing, investing, and distributing trust property.331
Business trusts facilitate exchange, rather than sharing, in pensions,
investments (asset securitization, mutual funds, and real estate investment),
and corporate and municipal bond transactions.332 Business trusts also serve
the functions of financing, risk-spreading, and specialization. For example, the
use of trusts as “special purpose vehicles” in asset securitization plays a key
role in structured finance.333 Financial institutions utilize business trusts “to
diversify lending risk,”334 and mutual funds rely on trusts to allow small
investors to diversify their portfolios.335 Corporate and municipal bond
transactions that embrace the trust form also benefit by having a trustee act as a
“sophisticated financial intermediary.”336
Trusts differ from other forms of inclusion in important ways. Inclusion by
waiver, rather than through a donative or charitable trust, would eliminate the
benefits of managerial intermediation.337 Moreover, while charitable trusts are
condominium laws, there is typically a lengthy Property Report that is provided to the purchaser that should
disclose the condition of the common elements.”).
329 See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402 (2010).
330 See id. § 405(a).
331 See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset Partitioning, in THE WORLDS
OF THE TRUST 428, 429–30 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing
Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 9), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2327153; see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 113, at 543.
332 See John H. Langbein, The Secret Life of the Trust: The Trust as an Instrument of Commerce, 107
YALE L.J. 165, 167–74 (1997); Steven L. Schwarcz, Commercial Trusts as Business Organizations:
Unraveling the Mystery, 58 BUS. LAW. 559, 562 (2003).
333 Schwarcz, supra note 332, at 564–65.
334 Id. at 565.
335 See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 113, at 556.
336 See Langbein, supra note 332, at 174.
337 See supra Part III.A.
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a “close cousin” to nonprofit organizations,338 a trust is more focused in
purpose and has more stringent fiduciary duties.339 Partnerships and
corporations compete with business trusts but, as discussed below, these
organizational forms differ in several respects, including their fiduciary duties.
Finally, John Langbein and others have noted the close connection between
trusts and contracts.340 Insofar as these forms differ, the differences seem
explainable by alternative approaches to opportunism. For example, trust law
entails a greater reliance on both asset partitioning341 and mandatory rules.342
Because a trustee acts as an agent of both the settlor and the beneficiaries, a
trust entails a high risk of opportunism. Robert Sitkoff emphasizes that the
“problems of shirking and monitoring, the driving concerns of agency cost
analysis, abound in trust administration.”343 The primary legal constraints on
this type of “agency misbehavior,” which Jonathan Macey describes as “trustee
opportunism,”344 are fiduciary duties.345 The duty of loyalty and duty of care
can deter trustees from misappropriating or mismanaging trust property.346 A
key feature of fiduciary duties is that they vary by context. For example,
fiduciary duties are more stringent in trust law than corporate law.347 This
tailoring of fiduciary obligations provides parties with multiple forms from
which to choose when deciding whether to include others.
The risk of opportunism is especially significant in charitable trusts. Unlike
donative trusts, whose beneficiaries often are in a position to enforce the
338

Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic
Analysis, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 437 (1998). On nonprofits, see generally Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of
Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835 (1980).
339 See Stern v. Lucy Webb Hayes Nat’l Training Sch. for Deaconesses & Missionaries, 381 F. Supp.
1003, 1013 (D.D.C. 1974).
340 See John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE L.J. 625, 650–59, 671
(1995); see also Sitkoff, supra note 126, at 629–31 (discussing the contractarian challenge).
341 See Hansmann & Mattei, supra note 338, at 472 (discussing how trusts play an asset partitioning
function that is impracticable to replicate via contract); Sitkoff, supra note 126, at 631–33.
342
See M.W. LAU, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TRUSTS 30 (2011) (arguing that, because of the role of
mandatory rules, “[t]rust law is not merely a specialized branch of contract law”).
343 Sitkoff, supra note 126, at 623.
344 Jonathan R. Macey, Private Trusts for the Provision of Private Goods, 37 EMORY L.J. 295, 316
(1988).
345 Id.; see also Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1049 (“[T]he problem of opportunism in circumstances of
asymmetric information explains [the] basic contours of fiduciary doctrine.”).
346 See Macey, supra note 344, at 316; Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1049; see also supra notes 203–05 and
accompanying text.
347 See Sitkoff, supra note 199, at 1045 (discussing how the agency problem in family trusts differs from
agency problem in publicly traded corporations); see also supra note 208 and accompanying text.
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trustee’s fiduciary duties, charitable trusts rely on state attorneys general, who
usually have limited resources, and little political will, to expend on
enforcement.348 As a result, some law reform efforts have attempted to
incorporate new enforcement mechanisms, including the expansion of standing
for the settlor, in order to monitor the duties of a charitable trustee.349
Business trusts also rely on fiduciary duties to prevent opportunism.
Historically, fiduciary duties were a key element in adopting the trust form in
ERISA and pension law.350 Even after ERISA, opportunism by an employer or
employees is still possible.351 However, in comparing business trusts and
corporations, Joseph Warburton finds that “trust law is effective in curtailing
opportunistic behavior, as trust managers charge significantly lower fees than
their observationally equivalent corporate counterparts.”352 Warburton’s study
suggests that “trusts are more effective than corporations in curtailing
opportunistic behavior by managers,” and that the fiduciary duties in trust law
are “a superior mechanism for mitigating managerial opportunism and agency
conflict within business organizations.”353 As discussed below, fiduciary duties
in corporate law may have certain offsetting advantages.
3. Extensions
a. Partnerships and Corporations
Rather than relying on business trusts, today’s business enterprises
organize primarily as partnerships and corporations.354 Including others via a
partnership (general, limited, limited liability, or limited liability limited) or
corporation (publicly traded, closely held, or privately held) serves several
functions, including financing, risk-spreading, and specialization.

348
See Susan N. Gary, Regulating the Management of Charities: Trust Law, Corporate Law, and Tax
Law, 21 U. HAW. L. REV. 593, 622–24 (1999); Joshua C. Tate, Should Charitable Trust Enforcement Rights Be
Assignable?, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045, 1047 (2010); see also Sitkoff, supra note 331 (manuscript at 20).
349 UNIF. TRUST CODE § 405(c) (2010); see also Tate, supra note 348, at 1051–56.
350 See Langbein, supra note 332, at 182.
351 See, e.g., Daniel Fischel & John H. Langbein, ERISA’s Fundamental Contradiction: The Exclusive
Benefit Rule, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1105, 1158 (1988) (“Once the initial agreement is concluded, either party may
have an incentive to behave opportunistically.”).
352 Warburton, supra note 208, at 183.
353 Id. at 187.
354 See Schwarcz, supra note 332, at 559–60.
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Partnerships are an alternative to debt financing,355 and corporations serve
as financing devices as well.356 In addition, partnerships and corporations both
help to spread risk. Indeed, one explanation for the partnership form is the
“insurance theory” of partnership.357 Likewise, in corporations, maintaining
limited liability and different classes of stock can reduce the risk borne by
shareholders.358 Finally, both forms entail specialization. In their seminal work
on the corporation, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means discuss the advantages of
separating ownership (by shareholders) from control (by managers).359 This
type of separation allows the officers to serve as “specialized managers of a
complex of assets,” while the shareholders, or partners, receive the “benefits of
this asset management” through dividends or earnings.360
Overall, partnerships and corporations provide more certainty than informal
inclusion, greater protection than contracts, and more flexibility than business
trusts. Specifically, informal inclusion is insufficient to provide the
permanence necessary for a business of potentially infinite duration. Contracts
may not be capable of replicating the functions of a corporation, including
partitioning assets361 and preventing opportunistic holdup.362 Partnerships and
corporations do serve as substitutes for business trusts.363 But these forms
differ from trusts, in terms of their insolvency regimes and residual
claimants.364 Plus, the flexibility of the corporate form may explain why most
owners incorporate rather than create a trust for their business enterprises.365
Partnerships and corporations both entail anti-opportunism devices. The
risk of opportunism is pervasive in partnerships, close corporations, and public
355 See WILLIAM KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE, Jr., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES 53–54 (3d ed. 1988).
356 See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW
10–11 (1991) (“The corporation is a financing device and is not otherwise distinctive.”).
357 See Kevin Lang & Peter-John Gordon, Partnerships as Insurance Devices: Theory and Evidence, 26
RAND J. ECON. 614, 614 (1995).
358 See POSNER, supra note 83, at 536–37; Schwarcz, supra note 332, at 574.
359
See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 114, at 5–7.
360 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 805–06.
361 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L.J.
387, 390 (2000).
362 See WILLIAMSON, supra note 120, at 47; Grossman & Hart, supra note 118, at 716–17.
363 See Henry Hansmann et al., The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective, 2005 U. ILL. L.
REV. 5, 14.
364 See Langbein, supra note 332, at 189 (discussing insolvency regimes); Schwarcz, supra note 332, at
585 (discussing residual claimants).
365 See Warburton, supra note 208, at 184 (“[T]he business flexibility that corporations grant leads to
greater agency conflict and risk taking, but also to potentially superior risk-adjusted performance.”).
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corporations.366 In partnerships and close corporations, “reputation and
interpersonal trust can play a larger role in protecting against opportunism.”367
Partners may apportion income to reduce strategic behavior.368 If shareholders
of a close corporation threaten to exit strategically, the corporate form itself
“provides a robust solution to the problem caused by threats of opportunistic
exit.”369 In addition, in publicly traded firms, the potential for investors to
“exit” by selling their shares may deter opportunism by managers as well as
shareholders.370 Corporate law also entails mandatory rules, such as disclosure
requirements and insider trading prohibitions,371 that may assist in deterring
strategic behavior.372
The ultimate safeguards against strategic behavior in partnership and
corporate law, as in trust law, are fiduciary duties.373 Although trust law, with
its more stringent fiduciary duties, may be superior to corporate law in
deterring opportunism, Warburton finds there is a trade-off: corporations retain
greater flexibility and achieve a higher rate of return for their investors.374 In
any event, the risk of opportunism, as well as the range of anti-opportunism
devices, is an important factor in selecting among such organizational forms.375
366 See, e.g., Paul G. Mahoney, Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations, in CONCENTRATED
CORPORATE OWNERSHIP 177, 177 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the
Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 238 (1992); Richard
Squire, Strategic Liability in the Corporate Group, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 605, 605 (2011).
367
Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 796 n.18 (2007);
see also Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and
Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24 J. CORP. L. 913, 927–29 (1999) (discussing nonlegal
constraints on opportunism in close corporations).
368 See Bradley T. Borden, Partnership Tax Allocations and the Internalization of Tax-Item Transactions,
59 S.C. L. REV. 297, 303–17 (2008).
369 Rock & Wachter, supra note 367, at 921.
370 See Darian M. Ibrahim, The New Exit in Venture Capital, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26 (2012).
371 See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation of Insider Trading, 35 STAN. L. REV. 857,
882–86 (1983). But cf. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the Dog That Did Not
Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167, 174–78 (2005) (noting the relative silence by “officers, directors, and controlling
shareholders” toward the issue of insider trading).
372
On the use of mandatory rules in corporate law, see generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Limiting
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law: The Desirable Constraints on Charter Amendments, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1820 (1989); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM.
L. REV. 1395 (1989); and Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis, 84
NW. U. L. REV. 542 (1990).
373 Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE
OF BUSINESS 55, 77 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds., 1991).
374 Warburton, supra note 208, at 184.
375 See O’Kelley, Jr., supra note 366, at 218–19 (explicating a “theory of form choice” in which parties
“choose a governance structure for their firm that provides the optimal mix of adaptability and protection from
opportunism”); cf. Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 190, 215
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b. Franchises
The franchise is a popular legal device for including others.376 The owner
of a franchise (the franchisor) may franchise an outlet by including another
(the franchisee), rather than expanding the firm, if doing so reduces agency
costs.377 Specifically, a firm will create a franchise if the agency costs of
franchising (inefficient risk-bearing, free riding, and appropriating quasi-rents)
are lower than the agency costs of owning and operating a new outlet
(managerial shirking).378
While franchises are an alternative form of inclusion for attempting to
reduce agency costs, there is a risk of opportunism by both franchisors and
franchisees.379 For example, franchisees may fail to maintain a brand.380 They
may “manipulate information” or shirk their obligations to provide customer
service and to “maintain the cleanliness of [their] unit[s].”381 Such actions
increase monitoring costs for owners and reduce the agency-cost advantage of
franchises.382 Conversely, franchisors may act strategically by threatening to
terminate an agreement to extract quasi-rents,383 although ex post rents may
discourage ex ante opportunism.384 Franchisors also may encroach upon
(2001) (“[F]irms select from among the menu of possible organizational forms for the very purpose of
surmounting the difficulties otherwise imposed by contracting costs.”).
376 See G. Frank Mathewson & Ralph A. Winter, The Economics of Franchise Contracts, 28 J.L. & ECON.
503, 503 n.1 (1985) (“Franchising accounts for approximately one-third of total retail sales in the United States
and Canada.”).
377 See id. at 503; Paul H. Rubin, The Theory of the Firm and the Structure of the Franchise Contract, 21
J.L. & ECON. 223, 226 (1978); see also James A. Brickley & Frederick H. Dark, The Choice of Organizational
Form: The Case of Franchising, 18 J. FIN. ECON. 401, 402 (1987) (“[T]he trade-off between agency problems
associated with each form of organization is an important variable in explaining how firms choose between the
two organizational forms.”).
378 See Brickley & Dark, supra note 377, at 403–07.
379 See Benjamin Klein, Transactions Cost Determinants of “Unfair” Contractual Arrangements, 70 AM.
ECON. REV. 356, 358–60 (1980) (discussing opportunism by franchisors and franchisees).
380 See id. at 358 (“Given the difficulty of explicitly specifying and enforcing contractually every element
of quality to be supplied by a franchisee, there is an incentive for an individual opportunistic franchisee to
cheat the franchisor by supplying a lower quality of product than contracted for.”).
381 Uri Benoliel, The Behavioral Law and Economics of Franchise Tying Contracts, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 527,
529 (2010).
382 See id. at 530 (“[O]pportunistic actions are likely to significantly increase the franchisor’s monitoring
costs and thereby off-set the reduction of the franchisor’s product-quality monitoring costs arguably generated
by a franchise tying contract.”).
383 See Klein, supra note 379, at 359 (“[T]he franchisor may engage in opportunistic behavior by
terminating a franchisee without cause, claiming the franchise fee and purchasing the initial franchisee
investment at a distress price.”).
384 See Patrick J. Kaufmann & Francine Lafontaine, Costs of Control: The Source of Economic Rents for
McDonald’s Franchisees, 37 J.L. & ECON. 417, 419 (1994).
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existing franchisees by authorizing new franchisees or establishing new outlets
to compete in the same geographic area.385
Franchises are an important organizational form because they are distinct
from other types of inclusion like contracts and leases. Although similar to
contracts, franchises differ because franchise law entails certain mandatory
rules (e.g., limitations on termination) and attempts to deter renegotiation in
ways that contract law generally does not.386 Franchises are also similar to
leases because a franchisor is leasing the use of its trademark to a franchisee
for a period of time.387 But, unlike leases, franchises do not entail any implied
warranties; instead, franchisees bear almost all the risk of a new franchise.388
Franchises also differ from corporations because they have different
residual claimants and control agency costs in different ways.389 In a franchise,
the franchisees are the residual claimants and thus have an incentive to monitor
their employees in ways that shareholders generally do not.390 Moreover,
unlike corporations as well as trusts, franchises generally do not impose any
fiduciary obligations on the franchisor.391
Finally, the Federal Trade Commission requires a franchisor to provide a
disclosure document to a franchisee fourteen days before finalizing a franchise
agreement.392 This mandatory disclosure is an attempt to reduce asymmetric
information.393 In addition to regulating entry, the law attempts to regulate exit
385 See Robert W. Emerson, Franchise Encroachment, 47 AM. BUS. L.J. 191, 193 (2010). See generally
Uri Benoliel, Criticizing the Economic Analysis of Franchise Encroachment Law, 75 ALB. L. REV. 205 (2012)
(discussing the short- and long-term effects of current franchise encroachment law).
386 See R. Preston McAfee & Marius Schwartz, Opportunism in Multilateral Vertical Contracting:
Nondiscrimination, Exclusivity, and Uniformity, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 210, 210 (1994).
387 See Rubin, supra note 377, at 224.
388 Franchise agreements usually do not include guarantees or warranties for franchisees. See Robert W.
Emerson, Franchise Contract Clauses and the Franchisor’s Duty of Care Toward Its Franchisees, 72 N.C. L.
REV. 905, 959 (1994).
389 See Steven C. Michael, To Franchise or Not To Franchise: An Analysis of Decision Rights and
Organizational Form Shares, 11 J. BUS. VENTURING 57, 61 (1996).
390 See Rubin, supra note 377, at 226.
391 See, e.g., Amoco Oil Co. v. Cardinal Oil Co., 535 F. Supp. 661, 666 (E.D. Wis. 1982) (holding that an
obligation of good faith under Wisconsin contract law does not make the franchisor–franchisee relationship a
fiduciary one); Crim Truck & Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp. 823 S.W.2d 591, 594–96 (Tex. 1992)
(rejecting the imposition of general fiduciary duties on the franchise relationship); see also Emerson, supra
note 388, at 922–26 (arguing that only “some clauses in a franchise contract merit the imposition of fiduciary
duties” but a general fiduciary duty for the relationship is not appropriate).
392 16 C.F.R. § 436.2(a) (2013).
393 Disclosure Requirements and Prohibitions Concerning Franchising, 72 Fed. Reg. 15,444, 15,534 (Mar.
30, 2007) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 436–37).
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via franchise termination laws that prevent strategic termination.394 Franchisors
structure agreements to minimize franchisee opportunism and choose this form
if it will reduce their own agency costs, so the law generally seeks to reduce
the possibility of franchisor opportunism.395
c. Co-ownership
Finally, co-ownership itself entails a type of inclusion if an existing owner
includes a nonowner in her property.396 Including a nonowner as a co-owner
may facilitate sharing (if gratuitous) or exchange (if for some consideration).397
Co-ownership also can provide a financing function if one (or more) of the coowners provides capital or assists in paying a mortgage.398 Co-ownership may
play a risk-spreading function, especially in the absence of insurance or other
support systems.399 Co-ownership also can facilitate various types of functional
specialization, from organizing a household400 to operating a taxicab.401
Indeed, co-ownership can be an alternative to other forms of inclusion, such as
forming a trust, partnership, or corporation.402

394 See Jonathan Klick et al., Federalism, Variation, and State Regulation of Franchise Termination, 3
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 355, 364 (2009) (noting trade-off in termination laws between “reducing ‘cream
skimming’” by franchisors and “preventing franchisors from disciplining shirking franchisees”).
395 See Antony W. Dnes, Franchise Contracts, Opportunism and the Quality of Law, 3 ENTREPRENEURIAL
BUS. L.J. 257, 270–73 (2009).
396 If an owner includes a nonowner as a co-owner, the new co-owner has a separate but undivided
interest in the property. See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 596 (“[E]ach interest is undivided, in the sense
that each tenant in common has the right to possess the whole of the property . . . .”).
397 See id. at 594 (“There are many reasons for multiple people to wish to be co-owners, involving various
types of multiple use and relationships based on sharing.”).
398 See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, THE HOUSEHOLD: INFORMAL ORDER AROUND THE HEARTH 85 (2008)
(citing Sandra Fleishman, The Buddy System; A New Theory of Buying Power: With Double the Income, Even
Singles Can Afford Double the House, WASH. POST, Mar. 17, 2001, at H.1; Jim Rendon, Splitting the Cost of
Buying a House, N.Y. TIMES, July 11, 2004, § 11 at 1). Legal barriers may prevent certain types of lending
among co-owners. See Bradley T. Borden, Open Tenancies-in-Common, 39 SETON HALL L. REV. 387, 428
(2009) (“The IRS’s prohibition against inter-co-owner lending finds little support in economic theory.”). Coownership also may impose additional monitoring costs on lenders. See Alex R. Pederson, The Rejuvenation of
the Tenancy-in-Common Form for Like-Kind Exchanges and Its Impact on Lenders, 24 ANN. REV. BANKING &
FIN. L. 467, 480 (2005).
399 See Ellickson, supra note 16, at 1341.
400 See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 30–53 (1991) (discussing the division of labor in
households and families); ELLICKSON, supra note 398, at 77 (“An increase in numbers may make it easier for
housemates . . . to specialize in their work both within and beyond the home.”).
401 See BARZEL, supra note 110, at 57–58.
402 See MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 595 (“For example, if A, B, and C want to share ownership of
a summer cottage, they could either hold title to the cottage as concurrent owners, or they could form a
partnership or corporation which would then hold title to the cottage.”).
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But co-ownership involves a risk of opportunism. In real property, coowners may fail to share rental income or pay their portion of the expenses.403
In intellectual property, Arti Rai et al. point out that “[p]atent law encourages
strategic behavior on the part of co-owners by allowing each one to ‘make, use,
offer to sell, or sell the patented invention . . . without the consent of and
without accounting to the other owners.’”404 Likewise, Robert Merges and
Lawrence Locke note that this “common ownership problem highlights the fact
that co-owners have incentives to behave ‘opportunistically’ with respect to
one another—i.e., to cheat on each other.”405
Co-ownership may entail excessive utilization or inadequate maintenance
because “[t]he effects of the use by each co-owner are only partially
internalized to that owner.”406 Yoram Barzel provides a particularly vivid
example of this problem, a cab that is owned and operated by two people.407
Given shared ownership of the cab, there is a danger that either owner may
engage in excessive use.408 While the co-owners may delineate time slots or
“shifts” for using the cab and pay for their own fuel, certain items like tires,
upholstery, and the engine are more likely to become common property.409
Like the law governing other forms, co-ownership law has developed
mechanisms to mitigate strategic behavior and conflicts over use. For example,
the right of partition “gives each cotenant an automatic right to terminate the
cotenancy at any time.”410 By giving a co-owner the ability to exit ex post,

403

See Evelyn Alicia Lewis, Struggling with Quicksand: The Ins and Outs of Cotenant Possession Value
Liability and a Call for Default Rule Reform, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 331, 349.
404 Arti K. Rai et al., Pathways Across the Valley of Death: Novel Intellectual Property Strategies for
Accelerated Drug Discovery, 8 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 1, 23 (2008) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 262
(2006)).
405 Robert P. Merges & Lawrence A. Locke, Co-ownership of Patents: A Comparative and Economics
View, 72 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 586, 592 (1990).
406 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 594–95; see also supra Part II.B.3 (discussing similar conflicts
between owners and nonowners). On the potential problems of common ownership, see generally ELINOR
OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 2 (1990)
(discussing a “pasture ‘open to all’” and noting that “[e]ach herder is motivated to add more and more animals
because he receives the direct benefit of his own animals and bears only a share of the costs resulting from
overgrazing”); Demsetz, supra note 9, at 357 (“[A]n increase in the number of owners is an increase in the
communality of property and leads, generally, to an increase in the cost of internalizing.”); Ellickson, supra
note 16, at 1327 (noting that group, unlike individual, ownership entails the “transaction costs of monitoring
potential shirkers and grabbers within the group’s membership”).
407 See BARZEL, supra note 110, at 57.
408 Id. at 57–58.
409 See id.
410 MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 598.
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partition may reduce the incentive to act opportunistically ex ante.411 However,
because any co-owner may utilize partition to force a sale of the entire
property, a co-owner also may employ partition strategically.412
Another co-ownership arrangement, one that may arise if there is a high
risk of opportunism, is a semicommons. A semicommons is a mixed form of
ownership containing both private and common property, which interact with
each other.413 As a result, a semicommons usually entails a risk of opportunism
by owners as well as nonowners.414 For example, if a private landowner is also
the common herdsman in a common field, the landowner “would have an
incentive not only to shirk but also to favor his own land,” by preventing
trampling or hoarding manure.415 As Henry Smith hypothesizes, the scattering
and intermixing of plots of land in the medieval open fields system made it
“difficult to direct animals in the common herd grazing on the commons away
from anyone’s plots and toward any other plots.”416 Ultimately, as Smith points
out, a semicommons is likely to arise only “if the benefits of multiple use are
worth incurring the costs of abating strategic behavior.”417

411 See id. at 604 (“Partition affords each co-owner an avenue for exit, and the threat of exit can help a coowner protect her interests.”).
412 See Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining Black
Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in Common, 95
NW. U. L. REV. 505, 508 (2001); John G. Casagrande Jr., Note, Acquiring Property Through Forced
Partitioning Sales: Abuses and Remedies, 27 B.C. L. REV. 755, 756–57 (1986); see also supra notes 318–19
and accompanying text.
413 See Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL
STUD. 131, 131–33 (2000) (identifying the open fields system as a semicommons).
414 Unlike prior explanations for scattering strips in open fields that emphasize diversifying risk, Smith
emphasizes the role of strategic behavior. See id. at 146–54; see also Robert A. Heverly, The Information
Semicommons, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1127, 1172–83 (2003) (discussing strategic behavior in “the
information semicommons”).
415 Smith, supra note 413, at 146–47, 149 (footnote omitted).
416 Id. at 147.
417 Henry E. Smith, Governing the Tele-Semicommons, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 289, 299 (2005). In addition
to open fields, scholars have identified semicommons in the Internet, information and creative works,
telecommunications, water rights, and software standards. See Lee Anne Fennell, Commons, Anticommons,
and Semicommons, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF PROPERTY LAW, supra note 89, at 35,
46–49 (discussing semicommons); James Grimmelmann, The Internet Is a Semicommons, 78 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2799, 2799 (2010) (“[T]he Internet [is] a particularly striking example of . . . a semicommons.”); Heverly,
supra note 414, at 1127 (“Information . . . is a semicommons.”); Smith, supra, at 289 (describing the regime
created by the Telecommunications Act of 1996 as a semicommons); Henry E. Smith, Governing Water: The
Semicommons of Fluid Property Rights, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 445, 445 (2008) (“The challenges of exclusion that
water and other fugitive resources present often lead to a semicommons . . . .”); Greg R. Vetter, Open Source
Licensing and Scattering Opportunism in Software Standards, 48 B.C. L. REV. 225, 226 (2007) (“Software
Standards are a type of technology semicommons.”).
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TABLE 1:
FORMS OF INCLUSION & ANTI-OPPORTUNISM DEVICES
Form of Inclusion

Mandatory Rules

Fiduciary Duties

1. Contracts

good faith and fair dealing; duty not to
defraud; UCC = quantity term

No

2. Licenses

implicated more often in certain licenses
(e.g., software licenses) than contracts

No

3. Easements

benefit and burden “run with the land”

No

4. Residential Leases

Tenant (T): implied warranty of habitability
(IWH); Landlord (L): constructive eviction

No

5. Commercial Leases

T: no IWH or suitability, but good faith and
fair dealing; L: constructive eviction

No

6. Agricultural Leases

T: no IWH;
implied covenant of good husbandry

No

7. Bailments

strict liability for misdelivery;
non-disclaimable rules to standardize

No

8. Cooperatives

IWH (residents = lessees)

board = loyalty (BJR =
business judgment rule)

9. Condominiums

no IWH; restrictions = “reasonable”

board = loyalty + care;
developers (split)

10. Donative Trusts

Unif. Trust Code (UTC) § 105(b): benefit of
beneficiaries, modify, inform, good faith

loyalty (sole benefit);
care (no BJR)

11. Charitable Trusts

UTC § 105(b); “charitable purpose”

loyalty (sole benefit);
care (no BJR)

12. Nonprofits

“any lawful purpose” but no distribution of
net earnings

loyalty + care
(similar to corporation)

fiduciary duties (in ERISA); information
disclosure (in mutual funds); no exculpation
Rev. Unif. Partnership Act (RUPA) § 103:
duty of loyalty/care (unless reasonable or
approved); good faith; disassociate; expel
duty of loyalty; meetings of directors and
shareholders; disclosure; no insider trading

loyalty + care
(no BJR)
RUPA § 404: loyalty; care
(gross negligence); good
faith/fair dealing

16. Franchises

good faith; franchise termination laws

No

17. Co-ownership

each co-owner has an undivided interest =
right to possess the whole of the property

No

13. Business Trusts
14. Partnerships
15. Corporations

loyalty (best interest);
care (BJR) + exculpation
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TABLE 1 (CONT.):
FORMS OF INCLUSION & ANTI-OPPORTUNISM DEVICES
Form of Inclusion

Remedies

Other Doctrines

1. Contracts

compensatory damages ($); at times,
specific performance (SP); no punitive $

duress; unconscionability;
limitations on stipulated $

2. Licenses

compensatory $; at times, SP;
injunctive relief under Copyright Act

irrevocable only if grant or
easement by estoppel; misuse 

3. Easements

If abuse of the easement, injunction =
majority rule; $ = minority rule

irrevocable but can abandon;
presumption against variation

4. Residential Leases

T: $, reformation, or rescission;
L: terminate = $ or maintain = back rent

T: can assign; no waste;
L: duty to mitigate

5. Commercial Leases

T: $ (disfavor SP); L: T liable as rent is
due, re-let for T, or accept surrender

T: can assign; no waste;
L: no duty to mitigate

6. Agricultural Leases

L breaches Æ T must perform, sue for $;
T breaches Æ L must perform, sue for $

T: no waste;
L: no duty to mitigate

7. Bailments

tort: $ for destruction, conversion, harm;
contract: $ (including foreseeable $)

bailee’s duty of care = default;
often, small stakes

8. Cooperatives

liens; ejectment (some states); breach of
IWH Æ $ = maintenance – rental value

financial disclosure; board
approval; often no subleasing

9. Condominiums

$ and injunctions (vs. board, neighbors,
or developer); board brings some claims

no partition right; restrictions
on leasing/subleasing

10. Donative Trusts

against trustee (UTC § 1001) = $;
removal (UTC § 706) 

asset partitioning; spendthrift
clause; ascertainable Bs

11. Charitable Trusts

injunctions; $; cy pres (reform as near as
possible to intent); removal (UTC § 706)

asset partitioning

12. Nonprofits

injunctions; $; cy pres; lose exemption;
personal liability; $ (= taxes owed)

certain disclosures to IRS

13. Business Trusts
14. Partnerships

against trustee = $;
removal of trustee (less rigorous)
$, all partners jointly and severally
liable, unless limited liability;
dissociation (RUPA § 602)

asset partitioning; conduit
taxation; voting rights
limited liability (LLP, LLLP)

15. Corporations

$, injunctions; also, derivative actions

asset partitioning; limited
liability; voting rights

16. Franchises

$, injunctions, future royalties (newer)

disclosure document (FTC)

17. Co-ownership

partition (for any reason or no reason);
accounting if partition or ouster

less customizable than trusts,
partnerships, or corporations
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***
Overall, each type of inclusion—informal, contractual, and proprietary—
has distinct advantages and disadvantages. Informal inclusion usually entails
little cost but may provide little certainty and few protections against
opportunism. Contractual inclusion is more costly to create and enforce but
may provide greater certainty and deter certain types of strategic behavior.
Contracts typically entail default rules, arms-length negotiations or standard
forms, and compensatory remedies. They also bind only the parties to the
agreement. By contrast, property forms not only bind third parties in ways that
contracts cannot but also entail a number of additional anti-opportunism
devices, including mandatory rules, fiduciary duties, and supracompensatory
remedies. These anti-opportunism devices help to deter certain types of
opportunism that contracts, by themselves, address only imperfectly.
Moreover, as the discussion above highlights and diagram above illustrates,
each property form entails a unique combination of anti-opportunism devices
and thus serves a distinct functional purpose. Overall, this proliferation of
forms helps to ensure that an owner’s private incentive to include others
converges with the level of inclusion that is socially optimal.
IV. THE IMPLICATIONS OF INCLUSION
A. The Property/Contract Interface
Understanding how owners include others has implications not only for law
reform but also for property theory. Recently, there has been significant
interest in the distinction between property and contract.418 Because inclusion
is highly customizable,419 many forms of property appear to converge with
contract.420 As a result, there is a tendency among some courts, law reformers,
and legal scholars to adopt a contractarian approach for many forms, including
licenses, leases, easements, trusts, and corporations.421
418

See, e.g., Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S378; see also Merrill & Smith, supra note 182,

at 774.
419

See supra Table 1.
See Merrill & Smith, supra note 182, at 774.
421 See, e.g., McCoy v. Mitsuboshi Cutlery, Inc., 67 F.3d 917, 920 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“Whether express or
implied, a license is a contract governed by ordinary principles of state contract law.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)); Javins v. First Nat’l Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071, 1072–73 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (“[A] warranty
of habitability . . . is implied by operation of law into leases of urban dwelling units . . . and th[e] breach of this
warranty gives rise to the usual remedies for breach of contract.”); EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 356,
at 15 (utilizing an “analogy to contract” to analyze the structure of corporations); French, supra note 242, at
420
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Yet, while many property forms involve contractual elements, most of
these forms differ from contracts in several ways.422 Because property rights
are in rem and run with the land, these forms often provide more certainty over
time, especially for future owners and users. Moreover, as discussed above,
many of the property forms provide additional protection against certain types
of opportunism because they rely to a greater extent on mandatory rules (to
prevent strategic bargaining), fiduciary duties (to reduce agency costs), and
supracompensatory remedies (to deter opportunistic breach). Thus, rather than
converging with contracts, these property forms perform distinct functions.
The reason that the law authorizes “multiple doctrines with differing rules
by which rights are subdivided”423 is to promote and facilitate cooperative
activities. Owners are more likely to include others if they are able to select
from among multiple forms, each of which entails a unique combination of
anti-opportunism devices. In certain situations, nonowners also may prefer
proprietary inclusion over informal or contractual inclusion because of the
certainty and protection against opportunism that particular forms of property
may provide. By reducing the risk of opportunism and other costs of inclusion,
a proliferation of property forms helps to ensure that the private incentive to
include converges with the socially optimal level of inclusion.
One lesson for courts and law reformers is that attempting to eliminate the
forms as functionally obsolete, or to rely exclusively on contracts to promote
the inclusion of others, may be misguided. Instead, by authorizing multiple
forms of inclusion, including informal, contractual, and proprietary inclusion,
the law promotes the social use of property.
B. The Numerus Clausus Principle
There is a related debate about why property provides pre-packaged or
“off-the-rack” forms. That is, why does contract allow free customizability,
whereas property entails a numerus clausus principle, in which the number of
forms is limited or closed?424 One theory is that off-the-rack forms reduce
1310 (“[C]ontract law . . . can be applied to servitudes.”); Langbein, supra note 340, at 671 (arguing for the
“contractarian vision of the trust”).
422 See supra Part III.C.1 (discussing justifications for distinguishing between contractual inclusion and
proprietary inclusion).
423 Stake, supra note 69, at 42.
424 For a seminal analysis framing the issue, see generally Bernard Rudden, Economic Theory v. Property
Law: The Numerus Clausus Problem, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE: THIRD SERIES 239 (John
Eekelaar & John Bell eds., 1987).

920

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 63:857

bargaining costs.425 A second theory, developed by Merrill and Smith, is that
some degree of standardization based on a menu of forms reduces information
costs.426 A third theory, formulated by Hansmann and Kraakman, is that the
law regulates the type and degree of notice for creating different kinds of
property to minimize verification costs.427
This Article does not contradict any of these theories. It also emphasizes
transaction costs (broadly understood). Like Hansmann and Kraakman, this
Article emphasizes the role of opportunism.428 However, unlike Hansmann and
Kraakman, who focus mainly on third-party opportunism,429 the primary focus
of this Article is on the risk of opportunism between the owner and nonowner.
The law authorizes, and attempts to maintain, the contours of a (limited)
number of forms in order to provide mechanisms for reducing opportunism and
facilitating inclusion. The law provides these various forms as “focal points”
around which parties can organize their activities by including others through
different combinations of anti-opportunism devices.430 Hence, property forms
not only can facilitate communication among market participants by reducing
information costs, and facilitate verification of ownership of rights offered for
conveyance by reducing verification costs, but these forms also create more
opportunities for cooperation between the original parties themselves.
The point does not contradict Merrill and Smith’s observation that the costs
of complex property interests are usually incorporated into the price of an
asset.431 Most of the costs discussed above, including disputes about
coordination, the costs of opportunism, and conflicts over use, like excessive
utilization and inadequate maintenance, are not third-party externalities.
Instead, such costs affect only the owner seeking to include or the nonowner
seeking to benefit from being included. However, if the incentive to include is
too low and diverges from the optimal level of inclusion, there is a social loss

425

See, e.g., Carol M. Rose, What Government Can Do for Property (and Vice Versa), in THE
FUNDAMENTAL INTERRELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND PROPERTY 209, 213 (Nicholas Mercuro &
Warren J. Samuels eds., 1999) (“[O]ff-the-rack property devices can reduce transactions costs . . . .”).
426 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 184, at 40; see also supra notes 182–84.
427 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S399–400; see also supra notes 185–89.
428 See Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 117, at S382–84.
429 See id.
430 See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 57–59, 71–74 (1980) (discussing the value
of focal points in tacit coordination, tacit bargaining, and explicit bargaining); cf. John H. Langbein,
Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 489, 493–94 (1975) (discussing the “channeling”
function of legal formalities for wills).
431 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 184, at 28–29.
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because certain types of inclusion that otherwise would occur may not. A legal
system that supports inclusion through the optimal set of forms expands the
production-possibility frontier by increasing the number of opportunities for
parties to cooperate in socially beneficial ways.432
A related, but relatively unexplored, question is how many forms are
optimal.433 The question is especially salient in the context of the property
forms that enable inclusion. Some courts have questioned the significance of
such forms, suggesting that the forms are antiquated or unnecessary.434 If so,
then it may be socially beneficial to reduce the number of forms, or eliminate
them altogether. Conversely, sometimes a single form (e.g., a lease) applies in
multiple contexts (agricultural, commercial, and residential) in which owners
may have different objectives and the form itself may serve different purposes
(e.g., financing, risk-spreading, and specialization).435 If so, then it could be
useful to divide the forms further so they correspond more closely with their
functions.
This Article suggests that restricting the menu of forms too much, or
eliminating them altogether, would be undesirable. There are advantages to
having multiple forms of property by which parties may include others. Each
form serves a unique function. At the same time, if the property forms were
freely customizable, the forms might be less effective as focal points in
facilitating coordination and cooperation. Because too much customizability
would result in confusion among the basic categories of forms, maintaining
clear distinctions among forms allows parties to select the form that minimizes
432 See JAMES D. GWARTNEY ET AL., ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 42 (12th ed. 2009)
(“Changes in legal institutions that promote social cooperation . . . will also push the production possibilities
curve outward.”).
433 See Merrill & Smith, supra note 184, at 40 (“We do not argue that any particular number of property
forms is in fact optimal.”).
434 See, e.g., Golden W. Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim, 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 378, 395 (Ct. App. 1994)
(noting that “[l]ittle practical purpose is served by attempting to build on this system of classification” because
“it is increasingly difficult and correspondingly irrelevant to attempt to pigeonhole these relationships as
‘leases,’ ‘easements,’ ‘licenses,’ ‘profits,’ or some other obscure interest in land devised by the common law in
far simpler times”).
435 See, e.g., MERRILL & SMITH, supra note 4, at 650 (“One problem that has long vexed lease law in the
real property context is that it does not differentiate between leases in terms of the underlying functional
reasons the parties have for entering into a lease.”); Carol M. Rose, Property in All the Wrong Places?, 114
YALE L.J. 991, 1006 (2005) (reviewing MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? (2003); and
KAREN R. MERRILL, PUBLIC LANDS AND POLITICAL MEANING: RANCHERS, THE GOVERNMENT, AND THE
PROPERTY BETWEEN THEM (2002)) (“The modern residential lease is worlds away from the agricultural lease
of the sixteenth century or from the modern commercial lease in a shopping center, but property makes room
for all of them.”).
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the risk of opportunism. Of course, as the benefits and costs of inclusion
change over time, the law can add or subtract new forms of inclusion and rely
on new devices and doctrines to deter opportunism.
C. The Right to Exclude Revisited
In analyzing the “social” dimensions of property, the prior literature
focuses on how using property may generate social costs and how owning it
may entail social obligations.436 By contrast, in analyzing the right to include,
this Article highlights another social dimension of property: property forms
can facilitate cooperation and, in doing so, promote the social use of scarce
resources.437
As noted above, one conventional view of private property is that property
rights are individualistic. Marx believed that human beings could return to
their true “social” existence only by transcending property.438 More recently, a
number of theorists have commented on the connection between property and
exclusive rights, on one hand, and individualism, on the other. For example,
Eduardo Peñalver notes that “the individualistic school of property thought is
certainly the dominant one within Anglo-American property law.”439 Likewise,
James Penner observes: “Our paradigm or standard ‘picture’ of property
comprises the single owner, along with their goods, occupying their land, to
the exclusion of others.”440 To a certain extent, this conventional picture of
property is descriptively accurate: individual rights in private property are a
central feature of any market economy. But many commentators often assume
that, because of this right to exclude, ownership is fundamentally inconsistent,
incompatible, or in tension with the “social function” of property.441
Recognizing that owners have a right to include, as well as exclude, helps
to clarify the social nature of property. Some owners may misuse their property
by imposing social costs on others, isolating themselves from others, or

436

See supra notes 7–8.
See PENNER, supra note 4, at 74–75; Penner, supra note 5, at 167.
438 See supra notes 33–35 and accompanying text.
439 Eduardo Moisés Peñalver, Redistributing Property: Natural Law, International Norms, and the
Property Reforms of the Cuban Revolution, 52 FLA. L. REV. 107, 195 (2000).
440 Penner, supra note 5, at 166 (footnote omitted).
441 Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, Introduction to Symposium, The Social Function of Property: A
Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003, 1003–04 (2011); cf. Penner, supra note 5, at 188
(noting “the individualistic taint which has attached itself to ownership, at least amongst legal and political
philosophers”).
437
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discriminating against others. But many owners decide to use their property
not only as a “wall” to exclude others but also as a “gate” to include their
neighbors, friends and family, colleagues and customers, and even strangers
who need help.442 If so, property is capable of promoting human sociability,
not merely atomistic individualism. In this way, understanding the right to
include may assist in properly contextualizing the right to exclude and perhaps
reconciling competing perspectives about the function of property.443
CONCLUSION
This Article has investigated how owners may include, as well as exclude,
others from their property. Until now, this “right to include” has received little
attention. But inclusion plays a valuable role in coordinating economic
activities and social relationships. By promoting sharing and exchange,
facilitating financing and risk-spreading, and enabling specialization, inclusion
can be highly beneficial. But inclusion also entails costs, such as coordination
difficulties, conflicts over use, and other types of strategic behavior.
There is thus a danger that the risk of opportunism may result in owners
including others too little. If law did not provide a range of options to reduce
strategic behavior, owners may decide not to include others in their property.
But the law provides multiple forms of inclusion: informal, contractual, and
proprietary. Informal inclusion entails the nonenforcement or waiver of an
owner’s right to exclude. Contractual inclusion involves a formal waiver of
exclusion. However, in addition to informal or contractual inclusion, owners
may include others through various forms of property, including easements,
leases, bailments, condos and co-ops, trusts, partnerships, and corporations.
Each of these forms entails a unique mix of mandatory rules, fiduciary duties,
and supracompensatory remedies. By providing more certainty and protection
against opportunism, these forms help ensure that an owner’s private incentive
to include converges with the level of inclusion that is socially optimal.
Analyzing the forms of inclusion suggests that the law should continue to
provide a range of options by which owners may include others. Because each
of the forms plays a unique role in deterring opportunism, these forms are
distinct from one another as well as from contracts. Authorizing a menu of
442

Cf. Penner, supra note 24, at 745 (arguing that “the ability to share one’s things, or let others use them,
is fundamental in the idea of property” (italics removed)).
443 Cf. Dagan & Heller, supra note 318, at 622 (“Sympathizers of privatization and communitarian
approaches have seen conflict where there can be—and from a global perspective, often is—harmony.”).
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forms not only reduces information and verification costs but also facilitates
cooperation by providing parties with focal points to coordinate their activities.
Ultimately, analyzing the many ways in which owners can include others in the
use, possession, and enjoyment of their property suggests that ownership is not
necessarily exclusive or individualistic. Rather, ownership is often inclusive
and thereby promotes the social use of property.

